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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In these related actions, appellee and plaintiff Utah State
university of Agriculture and Applied Science (hereinafter "the University") seeks to recover from appellants and defendants third-party
plaintiffs (hereinafter "the broker-dealers") various losses allegedly
arising from an investment program which it conducted from September
1970 to March 1973, on the sole ground that its securities purchases
were ultra vires.

The broker-dealers filed third-party indemnity

actions based on misrepresentation against members of the University's
Institutional Council and others who represented on numerous occasions
by official corporate resolution that the University did have the
power that the University now contends it lacks.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 3, 1979, the trial court entered orders in all these
cases (1) granting the University's motions against all broker-dealers
for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2) denying the broker-dealers' motions to dismiss the University's complaints
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

At the

same time it also entered final judgment dismissing all third-party
actions and counterclaims instituted by the broker-dealers.

All

broker-dealers appealed from those final judgments and also filed
petitions for intermediate appeal from the court's order granting the
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University's motion for partial summary judgment and denying the
broker-dealers' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.!/
All broker-dealers but Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. also filed motions to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction and Merrill Lynch filed a motion for change of venue.

These

motions were denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The broker-dealers seek reversal of the trial court's order
granting the University's motions for partial summary judgment and
denying their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
request that this Court remand the case with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the broker-dealers pursuant to their motions to
dismiss.

If this Court does not order dismissal of the University's

complaints, the broker-dealers seek, in the alternative, reversal of
the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment and an order from
this Court remanding the case for trial.

The broker-dealers also seek

an order reversing the trial court's dismissal of the broker-dealers'
counterclaims and third-party complaints.

In the alternative to the

dismissal of the University's complaints, the broker-dealers also seek
reversal of the orders denying their motions to dismiss for lack of in
personam jurisdiction and, in the Merrill Lynch action only, reversal
of the order denying its motion for change of venue.

i. Subsequently, this Court granted the brokers' petitions for
intermediate appeal and consolidated the two sets of appeals.
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction
A brief sununary of the genesis and development of this litigation may assist the Court in understanding the posture of these
cases before it proceeds to review the ensuing detailed discussion
of the facts.
In 1970, University officers, at the direction of the University's Institutional Council, launched a new and aggressive investment
program and began opening accounts with the defendant broker-dealers
so that the University could buy and sell securities, including common
stocks.Y

The program was "aggressive" in the sense that it was not

restricted to the classes of securities historically purchased by
institutional investors . .v'

All those accounts were opened pursuant

to official corporate resolutions adopted by the Institutional Council
which represented to the broker-dealers that the University had
power to purchase the securities·at issue.!/
Once the broker-dealers had received those express warranties
from the Council, they carried out the hundreds of orders for pur2.
Exhibit 49 to all depositions; Robins depo. at 18-19. Each
exhibit identified herein is part of one set of exhibits utilized
in all these depositions.
3.
September 19, 1970 Institutional Council resolution addressed
to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exs. 7, 8 and 9.
4.
Copy of resolution of January 20, 1972 is attached hereto
as Appendix B.
Institutional Council adoption of first resolution to Merrill Lynch on September 19, 1970, Exhibits 8 and 9 to
depositions; Council adoption of resolutions on January 16, 1971
and April 24, 1971 to broker-dealers not parties to these appeals,
Exs. 16, 86 (minutes of January 16, 1971 meeting), 38; Council
adoption of resolution on Janyary 20, 1972 sent to.all brokerdealers, Exs. 86 (minutes of January 20, 1972 meeting) and 33;
Council adoption of second specific resolution addressed to Merrill
Lynch on September 30, 1972, Ex. 46. Receipt of resolutions by
broker-dealers: Merrill Lynch, R. 1437-39; Bear Stearns, R. 2003;
Sutro, R. 125-26; Hornblower, R. Vol. 22, 1975. In all instances in
which similar
documents appear in all files, citations herein will
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chases and sales of conunon stock placed by Mr. Catron, the University's investment officer.

In almost all of those instances the

broker-dealers acted only as agents for the University and its purchasers or sellers, and only on a few occasions did any of them make
reconunendations that the University purchase any particular stock.~
The University heirarchy never once advised the broker-dealers
during this time that it might possibly lack power to make the invest·
ments which it regularly ordered them to make on its behalf, even
though it had ready access to the legal staff of the Utah Attorney
General's office.

After all of the transactions here at issue had

been fully executed, a general economic recession occurred and the
University's portfolio declined in value.
The

Unive~sity

then instituted suit in federal court against all

these broker-dealers, suing on various provisions of the federal
securities laws and also raising claims essentially identical to those
claims presently before this Court on these state court

actions.~/

Judge Anderson of the United States District Court for the District of

S. Defendant Hornblower acted only as an agent for the University in all of these transactions. Affidavit of Peter A. Nalewaik
of July 21, 1976, Hornblower, R. 73.
Defendant Sutro acted only
as an agent for the University in every transaction but one. It
acted as a principal in the University's transactions for Hanover
Square debentures, but that single transaction comprises an insignificant part of the University's claim against it.
Supplemental Affidavit of Felix M. Juda, Sutro, R. 1973. Defendant
Bear Stearns acted primarily as an agent for the University, and
acted as principal only in those transactions listed in the
Affidavit of David Cranston, dated July 28, 1977, Bear Stearns,
R. 1998.
6. The University's subsequent appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is a reported decision of
which this Court may take judicial notice.
Utah State Univ. of
Agriculture and Applied science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d
164 (10th Cir. 1977). A cursory review of the first few pages of
that decision, in which the appeals court discussed the nature of
the University's claims, demonstrates the similarity .of its
claims in federal court to its claims in state court.
The appellate
court
expressly
noted
the
the
University
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Utah granted the broker-dealers' motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment in those actions, all of which were based upon the
broker-dealers' assertion that the University failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted,l/ and the University then unsuccessfully appealed that ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit and sought certiorari to the United States Supreme
court, which was

denied.~/

The Tenth Circuit's decision was a unanimous ruling that the
University's theory of recovery, including its theory of selective
recission, was untenable.

One passage in that decision is a cogent

summary of the broker-dealers' position on the present appeals:21
The argument that the brokers are liable because
they should have known that the stock purchases
by USU were illegal under Utah law does not impress us.
USU seeks to take advantage of its own
wrongful acts.
It would retain the profits which
it has made and recover from the brokers the losses
which it has sustained. An ultra vires act of an
institutional customer may not be converted into a
wrongful act of a broker.'
At that point, the University then instituted suit in state court,
raising in that forum the common law claims which it had unsuccessfully raised as pendent causes of action in its federal suits.
It should be noted at this point that the broker-dealers are not
appealing herein from the trial court's dismissal of their third-party
actions against the Institutional Council as an entity, but are appealing only those third-party judgments entered in favor of the indivi-

.............__

7.
The
Lynch for
discussed
supra, id.

brokers' motions to dismiss, and the motion of Merrill
judgment on the pleadings rather than to dismiss, are
in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Utah State University,
at 171.

8.

434 U.S. 890 (1977).

9.

and Technology Act,
administered
549 F.2d at Library
168Services
(emphasis
added)
. by the Utah State Library.
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duals who were on the Council or were University officers.

Nor do

the broker-dealers appeal herein from judgments entered in favor of
the two banks whom they had sued on third-party actions below.

To

summarize, these appeals are concerned only with the following rulings:
1.

The trial court's entry of partial summary judgment in

favor of the University and its denial of the broker-dealers' motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim;
2.

The court's dismissal of the broker-dealers' counterclaims;

3.

The court's dismissal of the broker-dealers' third-party

actions against Institutional Council members and University officers
in their individual capacities; and
4.

The court's denial of the broker-dealers' motions to dis-

miss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Merrill Lynch's motion
for change of venue.
A.

The University's Investment Program.

Not one of the facts presented here has been controverted by any
party.

All of these facts except those identified as deposition

testimony or exhibits were presented to the trial court before it
dismissed the broker-dealers' third party actions and counterclaims,
and all these facts were presented to the court before it granted the
•
• t y I s mo t ions
•
f or partia
• 1 summary JU
• d gment.~
lQ/
Universi

10. Many of the facts set forth herein were first presented to
the court below at length in the brokers' joint memorandum in
support of their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, filed May 16, 1977. Bear
Stearns, R. 553. Each of the ultimate facts asserted in opposition to the third party defendants' motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment are pled in the brokers' third party complaints
and summarized at 4-8 of the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition to those motions to dismiss, alternative motions for
summary judgment, and the University's motion to dismiss the
counterclaims, filed on November 3, 1977.
Bear Stearns, R. 1151.
Finally, all the facts set forth herein were argued to the
court below in the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition to
the University's motions for partial summary judgment, filed
May 16, 1978. Bear Stearns, R. 2005.
The court below inadvertently omitted to file that memorandum with the Sutro pleadings,
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Origin of the Investment Program and Policy.

1.

In response to criticism from State officials of the University's
practice of leaving idle cash balances in local banks, 111 and in
order to increase the University's financial resources, the Institutional Council formulated and launched the University's securities
investment program in mid-1970.

Virtually all of the hundreds of

securities purchased by the University between mid-1970 and March 1973
(the period at issue) were of a kind not designated in Utah Code Ann.
§33-1-1.
One of the first actions the Institutional Council took in embarking upon the investment program was to approve a formal corporate
resolution on September 19, 1970, addressed to defendant Merrill
Lynch.

The resolution stated, inter alia, that the University was

"authorized and empowered to open and maintain an account with Merrill
Lynch .

for the purchase and sale of stocks, bonds or securities

" that the University's Vice President of Business and Treasurer,
Dee A. Broadbent, and its Controller, Donald A. Catron, were authorized
to place orders for securities on the University's behalf, and that
the resolution would remain in effect until revoked in writing. 12 /
On the same day, the Institutional Council commissioned President
Taggart to form an investment committee for the purpose of formulating

.
13/
an investment
po l'icy.~

The investment committee was composed of

11.
In the sununer of 1970 the Governor of Utah reduced the
University's budget by two percent.
Glen Taggart depo. at 33.
In response to University President Taggart's inquiry as to how
the University might make up this loss, the State Board of Higher
Education advised the University by letter to invest its idle
funds.
Id. at 33-34.
A few months prior to this, the Utah State
Auditor had criticized the University for leaving idle large
excess cash balances in local bank accounts.
Ex. 4.
12.

13.

Exs.

7, 8, 9, Bear Stearns, R. 2003.
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7.

-7-

three members of the Institutional Council
.

.

141

and three members of the ·

15/

University a dm inistration.~

In order to formulate such a policy, and after the University hac
already been engaged for several months in purchasing securities not
mentioned in Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1, certain members of the Investment
Committee!§./ and Catron and Broadbent attended an investment seminar
in San Francisco sponsored by the Ford Foundation on the subject of
securities investments by institutions of higher learning.

17

/

They

returned with a Ford Foundation report entitled Managing Educational
Endowments,

18

/ and Councilman Plowman gave an oral report on the

seminar to the entire Council on February 23, 1971.

191

Three of the themes put forward by the Ford Foundation at the
seminar, and in the publication prepared by it, influenced and became
a part of the University's investment program.

One theme was that in

the past those who managed portfolios of educational institutions had
lost, because of inflation, more money by being conservative in securities investments than by being aggressive, and that portfolio manager!
should move from fixed income securities to equity securities, ~'

14. Council Chairman Bullen and Councilmen Plowman and
Stockdale.
Ex. 10.
15.
Vice President Dee Broadbent, Donald A. Catron, and Jerry
Sherrat.
Id.
16.
Council Chairman Bullen and Councilman Plowman.
depo. at 24; Ex. 17 at 6.
17.

Id.

18.

Stockdale depo. at 34-35; Ex. 96.

Plowman

19.
Ex. 17 at 6-7, Institutional Council meeting minutes of
February
23,
1971.
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20/
to stocks.The Ford Foundation report also recommended that institutions not
be restricted to "conventional blue chips" in common stock investrnents. 211

The report stated 22 1 that the traditional reason for invest-

ing in blue chips
largely disappears when the primary emphasis is
shifted from avoiding losses to maximizing the
long-term return. . . • With a rapid advance in
technology and the resulting growth of major new
industries, many of the smaller and newer companies
are growing far more rapidly than the big ones, and
their stocks can offer rewards sufficiently large
to completely outweigh any additional risks.
A third theme of the Ford Foundation report was that decisions to pur-

chase or sell particular securities should be delegated to a single
• h regu 1 ar review
•
b y t h e institution
•
•
• . I s trustees.2 3/
manager wit

The University
ment program.

incorpo~ated

all these principles into its invest-

It subsequently invested in numerous common stocks,

some of which could not be called "blue chips," and delegated the dayto-day decisions to buy and sell to a single individual, Hr. Catron.
The identity, costs, sales prices, and current value of all the securities purchased by the University were all reported to the Investment

20.

Ex. 96.

21.

Ex. 96 at 16.

22.

Id. at 31-32.

23.

Id. at 31.
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committee and the Institutional Council on a regular and periodic
basis).!/
2.

The Council Authorizes A Margin Account.

In January 1972 the Council approved a new "broader" corporate
resolution, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B, which
represented that the University had power to purchase "securities of
every nature on margin or otherwise," and which again authorized
Broadbent and Catron to purchase and sell securities on the University's behalf.~

broker-dealers.~

A copy of this resolution went to each of the
At the time this resolution was approved by the

Council, at least five Council members fully understood what a margin
account with a securities brokerage firm was and understood that it
271
involved borrowing from the brokerage firm.
Councilman Olsen, then Chairman of the Business Affairs Committee, testified in his deposition that there was "quite a discussion"

24.
!:..s...:..• Broadbent depo. at 100; Hammond depo. at 17, 27;
Taggart depo. at 120-29; Plowman depo. at 30-31; Bingham depo.
at 12-13; Stockdale depo. at 42.
Typical of those reports are
Exs. 30 and 43. Admissions by Institutional Council members that
they had received and reviewed such reports appear at, ~·
Harris depo. at 26, 50; Plowman depo. at 30-31; Stockdale depo.
at 42. Furthermore, the minutes of the Business Affairs Committee
meeting of June 26, 1971, record the distribution to all Council
members of the March 31, 1971 investment position, which appears
as the second to last page of Ex. 23.
The Business Affairs
Committee meeting minutes of March 25, 1972 record that the report
of securities held by the University as of February 29, 1972 was
distributed to all but two of the Council members.
Ex. 86, March
25, 1972 meeting; Ex. 36.
~5.
Ex. 86, January 20, 1972 meeting; approval of the resolution by the Instututional Council as reflected in the Council
meeting minutes of that day, Ex. 33 at 4.

26.

See note 4 supra.

27. Council members Bullen, Hammond, Harris, Olsen and Bingham.
Bullen
depo. at 38, Hammond depo. at 11, Harris depo. at 25,
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about this new resolution, and that Councilmen Harris and Robins
expressed concern about the University purchasing securities on margin
at that

meeting.~/

Notwithstanding those concerns, the new resolu-

tion was approved by the Council and was subsequently forwarded to all
broker-dealers.

A margin account, however, was opened with Merrill

Lynch only, and interest paid to Merrill Lynch by the University on
that account.
3.

Initial Success of the Investment Program.

For the first year and a half the University's investment program achieved remarkable results.

As of March 31, 1972, the Univer-

sity had an unrealized gain of some $2.25 million.~/

Vice President

Broadbent testified that Council members were "awful happy.
never saw so much money made in their lives."

301

They

At the business

affairs committee meeting of March 25, 1972, Councilman Harris, then
Chairman of that committee, praised the investment program. 31 /
Council members and the University administration were, however, fully
aware of the risks they were undertaking in their objective to maximize return on University investments.
4.

Council Awareness of the Risks of the University's

Investment Program.
President Taggart, for example, testified at his deposition that
when the University entered into the investment program, he was aware
that this new "aggressive" approach carried the risk of higher losses
as well as the opportunity for higher returns, but that nonetheless

28.

Olsen depo. at 58, 64-66.

29.

Ex. 58; Harris depo. at 32.

30.

Broadbent depo. at 119.

31.

Ex. 36.
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.
.
,
.
h'
d'
.
n32/
he "did not consider it inappropriate to go t is irection. -

on June 11, 1971, Councilman Stockdale wrote a letter to Council
Chairman Plowman which remarked on the "almost unbelievable success"
of the program to that time, but which concluded with a prophetic
warning:E/
I am 100 percent in favor of getting every penny
we can from our idle funds but I do believe that
we have a serious charge placed upon us when we
invest public funds.
If we do well, very few will
remember but if some institution in the State of
Utah should make a blunder and lose a half million
dollars we would see criticism levied and legislation enacted which everyone would be sorry to see.
Mr. Stockdale advised Mr. Plowman in that same letter that he was

"afraid" that he had "developed a much more ·conservative attitude"
about the stock market than that which governed the University's
investment program.
Council Chairman Robins wrote to Councilman Harris, Chairman of
the Business Affairs Committee, on October 31, 1972, and advised Mr.
Harris, after referring to "substantial losses we have incurred on our
current portfolio" by that date that: 34 /
As you know, Jay Dee, I have sustained a fairly
strong position advocating an investment policy
designed to earn income well above the normally
accepted "fixed rates of return." By its very
nature this position implies that earnings will be
large at times and losses will be suffered during
other periods.
In April 1972, Councilman Harris expressed fear that the University would lose the substantial profits it had already accrued unless
32.

Taggart depo. at 41.

33.

Ex. 21.
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it abandoned its aggressive investment policy.

At an investment com-

mittee meeting on that date which he had called, he explained that:.12./
The meeting was called to get the University to get
out of the investment business, and that was my
recommendation even though the notes [minutes of
the meeting] didn't show just that plain.
But I
said:
"Look, you're sitting on a two and a quarter million dollar profit today," and that's the
only profit anyone knew about in April because you
had your March earnings report.
"You've got only
one way to go and that's lose it the way the interest market is going."
The investment committee did not follow Mr. Harris' recommendation.
All others present voted for the continuance of the prograrn. 36 /
At an investment committee meeting on November 10, 1972, seven
Council members were advised that analysts and economists "do not predict a rosy picture for the stock market" for the corning

year.11/

Councilman Hammond inquired:~/
Is there any thought that we should be a little rno~e
conservative and work out a balanced investment program? I question whether we should invest so much
in common stocks.

From my observations our present policy will make us
the most money and lose us the most, also.
On November 10, 1972, Councilman Harris advised the Council that

a decision would be made within three months to consider "putting more
money into conservative items instead of those that carry high risks. 1139 1

35.

Ex. 39; Harris depo. at 31-32 (emphasis added).

36.

Harris depo. at 32; Ex. 39.

37.

Ex. 49.

38.

Id.

39.

Ex.Sponsored
91 by
at
8 (emphasis added).
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Mr. Harris believed the University had some high risk investments as
early as April 1972. 4 0/
man Robins argued

At the same meeting, however, Council Chair41/

that:~

I have maintained this position very strongly that
we have an obligation to achieve rates of return
higher than normal.
I believe the market's trend
over the past 100 years has gone up.
Generally the
trend is going to continue to go up.
Despite these strong concerns and the Council's full recognition
of the high risks attendant to the kind of securities purchases they
were making, no member of the Council ever moved at any Institutional
Council meeting prior to December 1972 that the University's investment program be changed or that particular securities or classes of
securities be sold.

In December 1972 the Board of Higher Education

ordered the Institutional Council to liquidate the high risk portion
of its portfolio.

By that time, a recession had occurred and many

of the securities which the University had purchased had significantly
declined in value.
5.

Demise of the Investment Program.

The catalyst for the Higher Board's directions to the Institutional Council was an audit performed by Ernst & Ernst in the sununer
of 1972.

In late November 1972, during the course of that audit, the

accountants asked the Attorney General for his opinion of the legality
of the University's

investments.~/

Before the Attorney General had

responded in writing to that inquiry, certain members of the Higher
Board met with some Institutional Council members and University

40.

Harris depo. at 39-40.

41.

Ex. 49.

42.

Ex. 79.
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officers in Salt Lake City, on December 4, 1972.il./

At that meeting,

the Higher Board first directed the University to take "public funds
out of securities other than those specifically ordered by statute."!!/
Less than two weeks later the Attorney General issued a written
opinion that it was unlawful for the University to invest State funds

45/
in types of securities not designated in Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1,- and
within a week the Higher Board again instructed the Institutional
council by letter to liquidate all its securities which were outside
the ambit of that statute.!§./

The University eventually did liquidate

much of its portfolio, allegedly at a loss of several million dollars.!1/

6.

The Council's Failure to Seek Legal Advice About the

Legality of its Program.
Until Ernst & Ernst asked the Attorney General for an opinion of
the legality of the University's investments, no University officer or
Council member had ever asked counsel that question, even though they
knew they had access to the Attorney General for legal opinions on
University

business.~

They did not seek such advice even though

43.

Ex. BSD, January 10, 1973 minutes at 3.

44.

Id.

45.
A copy of that Attorney General's opinion is attached to
each copy of the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition to the
University's motions for partial sununary judgment, supra; n. 13
as Ex. B.
46.
The letter from the Higher Board to the Institutional Council containing these instructions appears at 3 of the January 10,
1973 Council minutes, Ex. BSD.

47.
Those alleged losses are set forth with particularity in
the Exhibit "A" attached to each of the University's complaints
against each defendant.
48. Councilman Olsen testified that the question of the University's capacity to invest was discussed, but he had no actual
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there were at least eight instances which might have raised this issue
in their minds:
a.

The Institutional Council stated in the first paragraph of

the Investment Position and Policy,i2/ formally adopted in 1971, that:
Utah State University recognizes its responsibility
to maximize the returns on the assets available for
investment to support the University.
As a public
institution, it also recognizes its responsibility
to protect the integrity of the public funds under
its jurisdiction.
b-f.

The issue of the University's capacity to purchase securi-

ties was presented to the Institutional Council on at least five
separate occasions from September 19, 1970 to September 30, 1972, when
the defendant

b~oker-dealers

each submitted resolutions calling for

official declaration of the University's power.2.Q/

~

On each such

occasion, the Council represented that the University had power without limitation to purchase securities.
g.

The Ford Foundation report which Council members brought

back with them from the January, 1971 seminar in San Francisco contained a four page section entitled "Legal Questions", raising this
issue. 51 /
h.

"Quite a number of the business officers" of the University

subscribed to or regularly received a periodical published by the
National Association of College and University Business Officers entitled The College and University Business Officer, Studies and
521
Management.
The March 1972 issue contains an article entitled

49.

Ex. 24

(emphasis added).

50.

~,

51.

Ex. 96.

Bear Stearns, R. 2003.
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Broadbent depo. at 108.
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"Current Trends in College and University Investment Policies and
Practices," which Vice President Broadbent had reviewed, and which
states at one point that:2..V'
Reports and articles are now accumulating with a common theme saying that revenue is anything legally available for expenditure.
I would advise that an absolute
first step is a written opinion by legal counsel for
the specific institution.
When most lawyers are asked for an opinion, they seek
to refer to governing laws.
Furthermore, although the Council was advised by the Attorney
General in December 1972 that many of its investments were of questionable legality, it failed to advise any of the brokers of that fact
or of the Attorney General's opinion until March 1973,W even though
all the resolutions it had addressed to the broker-dealers had stated
that those resolutions were to remain in full force and effect until
expressly revoked in writing.

7.

Events From December 1972 to March 1973.

During the interim from December 1972 to March 1973, Mr. Catron,
the University's investment officer, not only failed to liquidate the
University's portfolio, but instead began to purchase additional

. ·
· 1 arge amoun t
securities
in

55 / Th C
e ounci·1 f ai·1 e d t o d e t ec th"is

s.~

actions because Catron falsified reports to conceal those purchases
and because the Council failed to provide any controls over his investment decisions. 56 /

Not only had the Council given Catron respons-

53.

Ex. 35 at 3 (emphasis added).

54.

Broadbent depo. at 200, 275, 276; Ex. 63.

55. For example, there is a statement to this effect by counsel
for Utah State University.
Broadbent depo. at 201.
56.
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ability for making decisions to purchase or sell securities, he also
had sole control over the reporting of those purchases and sales and
sole control over the securities certificates.

The State Auditor

reached the following conclusions regarding this delegation of authority to Mr. Catron:221
Adequate internal control procedures were absent
permitting one person to completely control all
aspects of the pooled investment program. Such
centralized control exercised by one individual is
completely contrary to all accepted principles of
good fiscal management and prudent organizational
control.
The Council discovered that Catron had been falsifying reports a few
days before it finally advised the brokers in March 1973 that his
authority had been revoked.~/
Despite Mr. Catron's active buying during the three month period
from mid-December to early March, many of the losses which the University seeks to recover occurred before December 1972.

For example, the

University seeks approximately one million dollars from Hornblower,
which ceased doing business with the University altogether by the end
of September

1972.~/ All purchases placed through Merrill Lynch

ceased in October 1972.§.Q/
57. Ex. 64 at 19. Such adequate internal control procedures
were absent even though the University's internal auditor, Elmer
Watkins, had recommended such controls in 1971, in a document
entitled "Audit Program for Investments." Ex. 73. Despite his
recommendation of such controls in 1971, Mr. Watkins testified in
his deposition that not one of those controls existed in the investment program. Watkins depo. at 32.
58.

~,

Broadbent depo. at 201.

59. That Hornblower ceased doing business with the University
by the end of September 1972 is indicated by the complaint in the
Hornblower action, which notes no transactions after that date.
60.
Merrill
Lynch
complaint
so
indicates.
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~,

8.

The Broker-Dealers' Reasonable Reliance on Council

Resolutions.
Throughout the duration of the investment program, each of the
defendant broker-dealers relied on the Council resolutions addressed
to them, assuring them that the University had capacity and that
Catron had authority to purchase and sell all manner of securities on
611
the University's behalf.
In most of these transactions, as has
been noted, they acted only as agents and received no profits from the
transactions other than commissions.

Within a few days or weeks after

receipt of each of those commissions, the broker-dealers paid those
amounts out to satisfy other obligations.§11

For that matter, amounts

which they received on the few instances where they acted as principals
were also paid out within a few days or weeks after the transactions
had occurred.§]/

The

broker-dea~~rs

did not know that the University

was paying for these securities with funds which legally could not be
used for their purchase. 64 /

Nor were they aware of any fact which

might have led them to believe that Catron was using such funds.

651

They simply had no information as to the source of the funds which

61.
Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit); id. at 1422
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol.
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122
(Juda Affidavit).
62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.
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they received, and reasonably believed that those funds were properly
used to purchase the securities which Mr. Catron ordered.§.§./
B.

Progress of This State Court Litigation.
1.

Threshold Proceedings and Motions.

In late 1975, after all the University's federal court lawsuits
had been finally resolved in favor of these broker-dealers, the University began to institute these suits in First District Court in
67/

Cache County.-

The complaint in each case is nearly identical: the

parties are identified, and the University clai:r:is that each defendant
executed orders for purchases and sales of securities set forth in an
attached exhibit "A" to the complaints and that each broker-dealer
charged commissions for those transactions, "at the behest of Catron."
Each complaint then alleges that the defendant carried out Catron's
instructions, using funds belonging to the University, that the Universi ty has since sold those securities, and that as a result of those
sales it has lost the amounts set forth in each Exhibit "A".

The

University then prays for recovery of all its principal losses, all
commissions paid to each broker-dealer, both prejudgment and postjudgment interest and the return of interest charges paid Merrill
Lynch on its margin account.§.!!/
The three broker-dealers whom the University initially sued
69/

•

immediately removed each of the cases to federal district court- an.
66.

Id.

67.
The complaints appear at the following places in the record.
Hornblower, R. 1, 47; Merrill Lynch, R. l; Sutro, R. 1, 94; Bear
Stearns, R. 72.
68.

Bear Stearns, R. 72.

69.

Id. at 70.
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.
.
f or f ai·1 ure to state a c 1 aim~
. 101 an d mo t 'ions
filed motions
to d'ismiss
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

711

The personal juris-

diction motions were filed by all broker-dealers except Merrill
Lynch.12/

Although the broker-dealers requested oral argument on

their threshold motions, the court ruled, in response to a motion to
remand filed by the University, that the cases should be remanded to
state court, and did remand them in June 1976 before reaching the
broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) and personal jurisdiction motions.21/
Merrill Lynch then was sued and filed a motion for change of
venue, seeking transfer of its case to Third District Court in Salt
Lake County, on the grounds that it did business only in that county. 74 /
The University filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the
question of liability (reserving the question of damages for later
determination) in the Sutro case only, 75 / and Sutro filed a motion to
stay consideration of that summary judgment motion until the other

70.

Id. at 44.

71.

Id.

72. Merrill Lynch was the only broker who acknowledged that it
was doing business in the State of Utah, for which reason it did
not file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Merrill Lynch has offices in the State of Utah only in Salt Lake
County, however, and it therefore filed a motion for change of
venue to the Third Judicial District Court. Merrill Lynch, R.
19. Defendant Bosworth Sullivan, represented by other counsel in
these proceedings, similarly filed a motion for change of venue
which was resolved at the same time as the motion filed by Merrill
Lynch.
Id. at 233.
73.

Bear Stearns, R. 16.

74.

Merrill Lynch, R. 19.

75.

Sutro,
Sponsored byR.
the S.J.47.
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

threshold motions had been adjudicated by the court.2.2/
After all those motions had been filed the broker-dealers suggested a sequence for considering them.

The parties then briefed the

personal jurisdiction and venue motions, and the court heard oral
argument on those motions on October 18, 1976.ll/

All parties agreed

at that hearing that the only issues before the court at that time
.
. d'iction
.
were those of persona 1 )Uris
an d

78/

venue.~

The court later

denied the broker-dealers' motions on these two grounds . .22.I
One week after the court's memorandum decision denying the personal jurisdiction motions, to the surprise of all parties, the court
issued a second memorandum decision, denying the brokers' 12(b) (6)

motions.~/

Inexplicably, the court also granted the University

summary judgment against all broker-dealers despite the facts that Ill
the broker-dealers and the University had stipulated that the court
should resolve the threshold motions of personal jurisdiction and
venue in all of the cases before proceeding to consider the University's motion for summary judgment in the Sutro action;

(2) the Uni-

versity had not filed a motion for partial summary judgment against
any broker-dealer but Sutro;

(3)

even in the Sutro case, Sutro had not

yet had the opportunity to file any response to the University's
motion, because the parties had agreed that none of the remaining

76.

Id. at 18.

77. The transcript of that October 18, 1976 hearing has been
transcribed and is part of this record on appeal. Vol. 34.
78.

Id. at 3.

79.

Bear Stearns, R.

80.

Id. at 289.

292.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

motions would be briefed by the parties until the court had ruled on
the threshold motions;

(4) there had been no opportunity for oral

argument of the University's motion before the court, despite the
requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
local rules of practice, which provide for such hearing;!Jl (5)
the University had filed no memorandum opposing the brokers' 12(b) (6)
motions in any of these cases; and (6) the motions to dismiss had
never been submitted for decision by any party as required by Rule
2.8(c) of the Rules of Practice of District Courts in the State of
Utah • .§1./
The broker-dealers responded by filing a motion to set aside the
court's January 21, 1977 memorandum decision, on all the grounds just
83/
noted.~
The parties eventually stipulated that the court should set

81.
Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., provides that any motion for
sununary judgment "shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing," and that adverse parties may serve opposing affidavits "prior to the day of the hearing." If the granting
of a hearing was discretionary to the court, the rule would so
provide or would be completely silent on the need for a hearing.
Rule 2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
of Utah further provides that any party resisting a dispositive
motion "may request oral argument on that motion, and such request
shall be granted unless the motion has been summarily denied."
Sutro requested oral argument, Vol. 16, p. 98.
82.
Rule 2.B(c) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
of the State of Utah provides:
The moving party may serve and file reply points
and authorities within five (5) days after service of responding party's points and authorities.
Upon the expiration of such five (5) day period to
file reply points and authorities, either party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter for
decision.
83.

Bear Stearns, R. 301.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

aside orders it had entered consistent with its memorandum decision
denying the broker-dealers' 12 (b) (6) motions and that the court shoulc
also grant the broker-dealers' raotions to set aside the court's Januar
21, 1977 memorandum decision which had granted the University summary
judgment on liability . .§i/

The court did enter orders in accordance

. 1
.
85/
with that stipu ation.~
2.

TJie Broker-Dealers' First Rule 12{b) (6) Motions.

In a second attempt to establish an orderly sequence for disposing of the remaining motions filed with the court, the parties each
proposed a sequence for ruling on those motions, and the court ruled
on May 9, 1977, that the remaining motions would be treated in the
following order:

(1) the broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) motions would be

briefed, argued, and ruled upon first;

(2) if the court then denied

those 12(b) (6) motions, the defendants would be granted time to file
answers and third-party complaints and to file a joint memorandum in
opposition to all pending motions for partial summary judgment filed
by the University, and (3) the court set a time at which it would then
proceed to rule upon those motions. 8 ~/

All parties then filed memo-

randa with respect to the broker-dealers' 12(b) (6) motions,.§2/ which

84.

Id. at 420.

85.

Id. at 424, 428.

86. Order of August 29, 1977.
Id. at 836. While the court did
not sign those orders until August"-;- it ruled during the course.of
a hearing on May 6, 1977 that it would resolve all pending motions
in the manner reflected in its August order.
The reporter's
transcript of the May 6, 1977 proceedings with respect to that
scheduling order appear in the record as Vol. 35.
87. Joint memorandum in support of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, filed May
26, 1977.
Id. at 553. Utah State University filed a joint
memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss for failu~e.to
state a claim appears.
Id. at 618.
The defendants filed a Joint
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the court denied on July 6, 1977 in another memorandum
3.

88/

decision.~

The Third-Party Actions and Counterclaims.

Following the denial of their Rule 12(b) (6) motions, the brokerdealers filed answers and counterclaims to the University's complaints
and also filed third-party complaints seeking indemnity and contribution against officers of the University, Institutional Council members,
and

others.~/.

The broker-dealers also initiated discovery.2.£1

All of the third-party defendants responded to the third-party complaints by filing motions to dismiss or for summary

91/

judgment~

and

some third-party defendants moved to stay the broker-dealers' discovery and the court so ordered.

92

1

The University also filed motions

to dismiss the counterclaims filed by the broker-dealers against

88.

Mem. Dec. filed July 7, 1977.

it.~/

Merrill Lynch, R. 391.

89. Answer and counterclaim, Bear Stearns, R. 727.
complaints, id. at 748.

Third party

90. The brokers filed a request for production directed to the
third-party defendants, a separate request directed to the Council as an entity, and requests for admission of fact and interrogatories directed to the University.
Id. at 1599, 1906, 1911,
843, 776, 821, 902, 736, 846.
91.
In the Bear Stearns file, those motions are: motion of the
Institutional Council to dismiss third-party complaints for failure to state a claim for relief, motion to strike, and motion for
judgment on the pleadings, id. at 1727; motion of third party
defendant to strike third-party plaintiff's complaints, id. at
1057; motion of Utah State University to dismiss counterclaims,
id. at 1035; motion of third-party defendant to dismiss thirdparty complaints, id. at 1070; motion to dismiss third-party complaint, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, id. at 925,
1788. Similar motions appear in all related actions.

1 ;~6.
93.

Motions to stay discovery, id. at 807, 813; order, id. at
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The court heard oral argument on the foregoing motions on November
21, 1977.2.1/ and in March 1978 granted all of the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and also granted
the University's motion to dismiss the counterclaims.2..?f
In addition, despite the court's own scheduling order, despite

the fact that the broker-dealers had not yet been given an opportunity
to respond to the University's motions for partial summary judgment,
despite the fact that there had been no hearing on that motion, and
despite the fact that the broker-dealers' discovery had been stayed
by the court, the court once again granted the University's motions
for partial summary judgment on liability.2..§1

And once again, in

response to the broker-dealers' objection, the court entered another
order withdrawing that portion of its memorandum decision which had
granted summary judgment to the University. 97 /

Thereafter, in late

March and April 1978, the broker-dealers deposed, among others,
those who had been members of the Institutional Council and officers
of the University during the relevant time period.2.§/

94.
The transcript of that hearing is Vol. 38 of this record
on appeal.
95.

Mem~ Dec. filed March 3, 1978.

96.

Id.

97.

Order of March 21, 1978.

Bear Stearns, R. 1775.

Id. at 1841.

98.
Identical notices of deposition and subpoenas were filed
in all related actions. The defendants' notices of taking depositions appear in the Bear Stearns file at 901, 782, 1812, 1920,
1793, 1893. Subpoenas Duces Tecum appear in that file at 1805
(directed to Dee Broadbent) and 1808 (directed to Ernst & Ernst).
The depositions taken by all defendants in these related cases
are volumes 41 through 62 of this record on appeal.
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4.

Final Rulings on the University's Partial Sununary

Judgment Motions and the Broker-Dealers' Second Rule 12(b) (6) Motions.
All parties briefed the University's motions for partial swrunary
judgment in accordance with the court's scheduling order and the
broker-dealers renewed their motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.22./

Defendants Merrill Lynch and Shearson Hammill also filed

motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the University had
.
.
. h
su ff ere d no d amage as a resu 1 t o f its transactions wit

100/

them.~-

On October 27, 1978, the court for the third time prematurely
granted the University's motions for partial swrunary judgment and for
the second time denied the broker-dealers' motions' to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.

1011

The court so ruled without permitting

the broker-dealers a hearing which they requested and to which they
were entitled. 102 1

The court explained the basis for its decision:

99.
Second motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Bear Stearns, R. 1984.
100.
The memorandum filed by both those brokers appears in the
Merrill Lynch file, R. 1401.
101.

Mem. Dec. filed October 27, 1978.

102.

Id. at 1987.

103.

Id at 2185-86.

Bear Stearns, R. 2183.
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103

1

This Court has repeatedly stated and now holds that
in this case there are more than two parties interested in this matter and who have financial interest
other than Utah State and the brokers and that is
the taxpayers whose money was used in these transactions and whose money was lost by reason of these
transactions. This Court feels that the brokers
cannot escape liability for their illegal acts, acts
with which they are charged legally with knowing to
be illegal by saying officials of Utah State also
knew this and were charged with this knowledge.
The
Court feels where a governmental entity is involvecl"
and the parties are char~ed with the legal use of
public funds that the ot er illegal party cannot
escape liability by sayini the specific party we
dealt with does not come into this matter with clean
hands either.
In other words, the court ruled that, as a matter of law and regardless of what the facts might be, private parties dealing with governmental entities are strictly liable in ultra vires cases because they
are charged with knowledge of that illegality, and that the government
itself is never charged with the consequences of its own illegal
actions. 104 1
Thereafter, following further proceedings to obtain final judgment in the third party actions, the broker-dealers (1) petitioned for
intermediate appeal from the court's partial summary judgment ruling
and its denial of their motions to dismiss and (2) filed final appeals
from the third-party action dismissals.

All those appeals have now

been consolidated and this Court will be able to give the trial court

H

the guidance it sought in its memorandum decision of January 9, 1979:[The Supreme Court can] make first a decision on liability. Of course, if they find no liability this
would necessarily be as far as they would have to go
and would decide all issues.
If they decide there is
liability on the part of the brokers to Utah State,
they can then determine the position of the third
party defendants.
104. The court so ruled even though both the court and counsel
for the officers and Council members had indicated that those
individuals should probably be charged with constructive knowledge
that.these transactions were ultra vires.
Tr. of Nov. 21, 1977
hearing at 23 (remarks of the court) , 57 (remarks of Mr. Campbell) (Vol.
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105.

Mem. Dec., filed January 9, 1979, Bear Stearns, R. 2204.

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
These cases present to this Court a major issue of public policy.
That issue is whether there are, under any conceivable state of facts,
any limits on the ability of the sovereign to recover against its
innocent agents the losses which it sustains as a result of the proprietary and ultra vires conduct, negligence and irresponsibility of
its own high public officers.

These cases are before this Court, not

after complete discovery and trial, but from Rule 12(b) (6) motions and
motions for summary judgment.
Of course, on an appeal from a motion to dismiss, every allegation in the third-party complaint must be deemed to be true.

106

1

To

affirm the trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment, this
Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the brokerdealers and must find that there are indeed no material issues of fact
107
created by any one of the broker-dealers' affirmative defenses.
1
To affirm that partial summary judgment ruling, this Court must rule
that the broker-dealers must be liable to the University regardless of
the degree of wrongdoing by its own officers, regardless of the fact
that the University here seeks to sue on contracts which it claims are
illegal, and regardless of the fact that no private corporate or
individual plaintiff could recover under facts similar to those already adduced

in these cases.

Food Mach. & Chem. Cor .,
ru e
107.
Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d
758 (1967).
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To affirm the decision below, this Court must bow to the archaic
and discredited concept that the King can do no wrong in propriety
as well as in governmental activities.

To affirm the trial court's

rulings, this Court must agree with the court below that the taxpayers
are talismanic, that if any of their tax monies were ever paid on an
ultra vires contract their money must be recovered by the sovereign
who expended it, and that the sovereign may recover, not only against
the parties to his transaction, but also against persons who acted
only as intermediaries in those transactions, who received no profits
apart from small commissions, and who are guilty of no wrongdoing
greater than scrupulously following the instructions of the sovereign
in carrying out those transactions.

The Court must also rule that

those private parties may not recover on those facts against the high
public officers who induced them to carry out business for the severeign.
When the trial court ruled, it did know that University officers
and Council members had actual notice of every transaction at issue
here, and had approved or ratified each such transaction both before
and after it was executed, and had represented to the broker-dealers
by official corporate resolution that the University had the power
the University now denies.

The trial court agreed that those persons

must be charged with constructive notice that their conduct was ultra
.
108/ .
h
vires,-- ~· that their conduct in supervising and approving t ese
purchases was in excess of their statutory authority.

It knew that

those persons had been criticized by the State Auditor for delegating
so much responsibility to Mr. Catron (negligence), and that they did
108. Tr. of Nov. 21, 1977 hearing at 23 (Vol. 38).
Counsel for
most of ~he individual third party defendants essentially conceded this at the same hearing.
Id. at 57 (remarks of Mr.
Campbell).
It is widely recognized that a public officer must
take note of the extent of his own powers.
~· Casby v.
Thompson,
42
Mo.Law Library.
133 Funding
(1868);
State
Moreland,
152
Okla. 37, 3
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not advise the brokers that Catron's authority had been rescinded
until March 1973 (a purely ministerial act).

Its rulings in light of

those facts are inexplicable and should be reversed.
It will be assumed arguendo for purposes of all the arguments in
this brief, except for Arguments VI and VII in Part One, that all the
stock purchases and sales at issue herein were indeed ultra vires
under state law.
PART ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
DENYING THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

I.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY
IS ESTOPPED TO RECOVER ON THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE HERE.
For nearly three years, from July 1970 to March 1973, the University's extensive investment program was closely supervised by the
Institutional Council which instituted it.

The Council's members were

knowledgeable and sophisticated individuals,

1091 fully aware of the

risks of loss which they had assumed for the University.

To implement

its carefully articulated goal of maximizing the University's investment returns, the Council approved at least five separate corporate
resolutions addressed to the defendant broker-dealers, advising them
that the University had power to purchase the securities at issue on
margin or otherwise, that Broadbent or Catron had authority to order
those securities on the University's behalf, and that all those resolutions would remain in full force and effect until expressly revoked
in writing.
109.
Brief biographical sketches of several council members,
developed from their depositions, are attached as Appendix A to
this brief.
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Nearly all of the securities purchased by the University from
July 1970 to March 1973 were of a kind not mentioned in section
33-1-1 of the Utah Code.

Assuming that the University could not

lawfully purchase such securities, the trial court nevertheless should
have held that the University is estopped from asserting claims for
its investment losses against these broker-dealers, whose only sins
were to believe and rely upon the formal action of the Institutional
Council and religiously to carry out its instructions as its agents.
A.

Application of Estoppel in Government Cases.

There are four elements of estoppel traditionally applied in
suits involving both private and government parties, each of which is
also present here:
1.

The party to be estopped must know the facts;

2.

He must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so

act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is
so intended;
3.

The latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and

4.

He mus t

. .
llO/
re 1 y on t h e f ormer I s con d uct to h.is inJury.~-

Despite the widespread application of the estoppel defense in
private actions, the now largely discarded traditional view in the
United States was that estoppel could not lie against the government.111/

That principle has always been a branch of the doctrine of

.
.
.
112/
sovereign immunity.~-

Sovereign iwmunity of course shields the

110.
United States v. Georgia-Pacific co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th
Cir. 1970), quoting Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d
100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960).
111.
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §17.01 at 491
(1958).
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government from liability for its torts or breaches of contract.

The

traditional view of estoppel simply applied the same principle as a
sword rather than a shield:

the rule precluding estoppel meant that

the government could not be barred from recovery against private
parties regardless of its own torts or breaches of contract.
Whatever policy arguments might ever have supported the universal
application of either of those principles have been seriously eroded,
however.

113

/

The traditional doctrine was first reversed in cases

where the sovereign had acted in a proprietary rather than in a governmental capacity, i.e., where its conduct had a strong corollary in the
marketplace and did not resemble the traditional functions of governing.

~· Greenhalgh v. Payson City. 114 /
This Court has on several occasions recognized the impropriety

of granting sovereign immunity to the government when engaged in
proprietary functions:

"Where a public body, which would otherwise be

entitled to sovereign immunity, engages in an activity of a commercial
or proprietary character, the protection does not exist."

115

1

The

brokers respectfully submit that few activities are more clearly "of
a commercial or proprietary character" than the purchase and sale of
the common stocks in the University's portfolio.
In fact, this Court was one of the earliest jurisdictions to
apply estoppel against a governmental body.

In Wall v. Salt Lake

113. Mounting criticism by commentators led the courts to abandon these doctrines.
See, ~· Berger, Estoppel Against the
Government, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 680, 686 (1954); Newman, Should
Official Advice Be Reliable? -- Proposals as to Estoppel and
Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 374
( 19 5 3) .
114.

530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975).

115.
Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement Dist., 16
Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d 203, 205 (1965). Accord: Gordon v.
Provo City,
15 Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430, 431-32 (1964).
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City,116/ the Court estopped the municipality because of the equities
.
present in that

117/

case:~-

[Here] the municipality, by its own affirmative acts,
declarations, and conduct, misled the party, or
induced him to believe that he had the right to rely
upon the assurances which the municipality, after a
long period of time, sought to repudiate to his
injury.
Of course, not every representation by any governmental employee
will give rise to a defense of estoppel.

But where, as here, high

ranking public officials reassure a private party who relies on their
assurances of the validity of his action, estoppel will be applied by
the courts.

An early decision which is instructive on this question

was issued by the United States Supreme Court one hundred years ago.
Hackett v. City of Otawa.JJJ..../

The Court there held that officials of

a municipal corporation who had represented under official corporate
seal to a purchaser of municipal bonds that the bonds were being
offered for a lawful purpose were estopped later to claim that the
bonds were void and issued unlawfully.
As in these cases, the public entity made a representation under
formal seal to a private party engaged in business with it that it had
capacity to undertake that business, the private contracting party
relied to his detriment on that representation, and it subsequently
appeared that the sovereign's action exceeded its power under law.
The Court noted that the "recitals of the bonds, in themselves, furnish no ground whatever to suppose that the Council transcended its
authority, or issued them for other than [municipal] purposes.

116.

50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766

They

(1917).

117.
Id. at 601, 168 P. at 769. Accord:
Tooele City v.
Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 594, 116 P.2d 406 (1941) (affirming the
estoppel principles expressed in Wall).
118.

99

u.s.

86 (1878).
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justify the opposite conclusion." 119/

It therefore estopped the city

from declaring the bonds to be void.
B.

Estoppel Should Be Applied Because the Broker-Dealers Cannot

Be Charged With Constructive Notice That These Transactions Were
Ultra Vires.
The trial court's sole basis for imposing liability on the defendants was its reiterated assertion that, because they are charged
with constructive notice that the subject transactions were ultra
vires, none of their affirmative defenses (including estoppel) could
1201
absolve them of liability on those transactions.
The trial court
erred in so ruling because the broker-dealers cannot be charged with
constructive notice.

119.

1211

The University should therefore be estopped

Id. at 90.

120. Memorandum Decision of Jan. 9, 1979 at 3, R. 2202 (Bear
Stearns).
121.
The broker-dealers cannot be so charged because they did
inquire about capacity and authority from the council, the governing body of the University.
The cases support the logical
conclusion that one who has made diligent inquiry is relieved of
the burden of constructive notice:
It if appears that the person sought to be charged
with notice was not heedless of the warning signals,
but made inquiry and used due diligence to discover
the facts which were suggested by the facts of which
he had knowledge, and yet failed to obtain knowledge
thereof, the inference of notice is rebutted and he
is not affected thereby.
-- 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notice, §10 (citations omitted).
Accord: Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 54 Minn. 56, 55 N.W.
825 (1893); Federman v. VanAntwere, 276 Mich. 344, 267 N.W. 856
(1936); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Cody Finance Co., 214
F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1954).
Logically, the law is that if one is approached by an agent
who represents that he has authority and that his principal has
capacity to enter into a contract, the person to whom to go for
reassurance of that capacity and authority is the principal himself, which the brokers did when they made these inquiries of the
council.
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to recover from them because its officers should be so charged, while
the defendants are innocent of knowledge of illegality.
In holding that the city was estopped from declaring the bonds
void and in excess of its power, the Supreme Court concluded in
Hackett that the private contracting party was not put on any notice
that those bonds were unlawful because the city's affirmative misrepresentations relieved him from ascertaining the legal limits of its
power to issue such bonds.

Under such circumstances, the court con-

cluded, 122;
It would be the grossest injustice, and in conflict with all the past utterances of this court,
to permit the city, having power under some circumstances to issue negotiable securities, to escape
liability upon the ground of the falsity of its own
rearesentations, made through official agents and
un er its corporate seal, as to the purposes with
which these bonds were issued. Whether such representations were made inadvertently, or with intention • • . to avert inquiry • . . the city, both
upon principle and authority, is cut off from any
defense • . • •
The broker-dealers respectfully submit that a closer analogy to
the facts present here would be difficult to create:

in the cases,

at bar, the governing body of the public corporation 123 1 warranted
under its official seal that the corporation had capacity and that its
designated agents had authority to engage in all the transactions
which it now asserts were ultra vires, its sole basis for imposing
liability on the private parties through whom it effected those trans·
actions.

Under such circumstances, the brokers were relieved of any

141 Neb. 719, 4 N.W.2d 889 (1942); State Bank of Binghamton v.
Bache, 162 Misc. 128, 293 N.Y.S. 667 (S.Ct. 1937); Dodd v. First
State Bank & Trust Co., 64 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
Cf. Standard Parts Co. v. D&J Inv. Co., 288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955).
122.

99 U.S. at 96.

123.
§§53-48-15,
53-48-19,
Utah
Code
Ann.
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duty they might possibly have had to inquire into state statutes on
the University's capacity to purchase and sell securities, as was the
bond purchaser in Hackett.

Accordingly, the University should be

estopped to recover from them.
It is true that this Court has recognized the general principle,
subject to exception, that persons dealing with public officers are
~,

bound to inquire into the limits of their authority.
Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University.

124

/

First

But in these

cases, that duty of inquiry was fulfilled, as each of these brokers
did in fact take action to resolve that precise question. 125 1

There

were no Institutional Council resolutions before the court in First
Equity, so this issue was not addressed in that opinion.
C.

Impact of Estoppel in These Cases.

To estop the University in these cases would not negate legislative restrictions on the University's investments.

Indeed, following

the investments at issue here the State Legislature, by the State
Money Management Act of 1974, Utah Code Ann. §§51-7-1 et seq.

(Supp.

1977), clarified the University's power to invest in securities.
Estoppel of the University in this case would not set a precedent for
allowing public officers to legislate by administrative fiat in future
circumstances, but would only relieve private parties in egregious
instances, as this Court did in Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra,

126

1

from the consequences of their justified and detrimental reliance on
sovereign warranties in limited circumstances where .the sovereign has
acted in a clearly proprietary capacity.
124.
125.
126.

544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).
I.e., they requested and received the Council resolutions.
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In the landmark decision applying estoppel to the goverrunent,
the United States Supreme Court similarly allowed one individual to
escape the burden of one statute, without relieving anyone else from
compliance with that statute, under circumstances analogous to those
present here.

In Moser v. United States, 127 1 a Swiss citizen relied

on the express written assurances of a State Department officer that

he would not be barred froin seeking American citizenship if he applied
for an exemption from military service.

In fact, however, a federal

treaty provided that exemption from military service would bar ci tizer
ship, so the public officer's warranty to Moser constituted an ultra
vires promise to him.

In allowing Moser to obtain citizenship despite
1281
the express provisions of the treaty, the Supreme Court explained:'-Petitioner had sought information and guidance from
the highest authority to which he could turn . .
He was led to believe that he would not thereby
lose his rights to citizenship.
If he had known
otherwise he would not have claimed exemption.
In
justifiable reliance on this advice he signed the
papers sent to him by the Legation.
D.

This Court, Like the Majority of Courts, Should Allow

Estoppel Under These Circumstances.
In these cases, each broker asked for express assurances of the
propriety of the University's conduct before agreeing to open an
account for it, assurances which each broker received from the Counci
and upon which each broker justifiably relied.

As was Moser, the

brokers were "lulled . . . into misconception of the legal consequences" of their actions,12V and the trial court should have held
that the University was estopped to recover under those circumstances

127.

341 U.S. 41 (1951).

128.

Id. at 46.

129.

Id.
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In ruling for Moser, the Supreme Court simply applied in a governmental context the elementary principle of agency law which has long
held the principal bound by the representations of his agent. 13 0/
Similarly, in City of Marseilles v. Hustis, l3l/ an Illinois
court agreed in principle with

~

when it held that:

The general principle that a person takes the risk
that the government officer to whom he speaks has
the authority which he purports to have is not
applicable here in light of the rule cited earlier
to the effect that the doctrine of estoppel can be
invoked where a party is induced by the conduct of
municipal officers and where in the absence of
relief he would suffer substantial loss.
In Franks v. City of Auroraf 32 I

the Colorado Supreme Court estopped

the City to repudiate the apparent authority of its city engineer,
133
stating:
/
In considering whether the undisputed facts result
in defendants' liability, it may be assumed that the
engineer had no actual authority to modify the terms
of this contract.
It seems inconceivable that a municipal corporation
can virtually supervise every detail of performance
of an entire project and can long thereafter repudiate the supervisory authority of its own engineer
adopting in retrospect the position that a contracting party should have disregarded the instructions
of its own agent and should have adhered to the
original specifications notwithstanding the engineer's disapproval. As we view it, the undisputed
facts support a conclusion of justifiable reliance
on the appearance of authority which was exhibited
by these defendants.
[Emphasis added]
Here, too, the Institutional Council and its Investment Committee
were informed of every transaction upon which the University here

130.

~·

131.

27 I l l . App.

132.

147 Colo. 25, 362 P.2d 561 (1961).

133.

362 P.2d at 563.

Restatement of Agency Second, §§140, 141, 143.
3d 454, 325 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1975).
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seeks recovery over a period spanning almost three years.

Each

written resolution sent by the Council to the brokers was the subject
of discussion at an Institutional Council meeting before its approval.
Every element of estoppel, as applied against the government in the
foregoing decisions and in many others, is present in these cases.
The only law cited by the University in support of its recovery
in these actions is a collection of cases exclusively from other jurisdictions, most of which are more than thirty years old, many of which
have subsequently been expressly overruled by later decisions in the
same jurisdictions, and nearly all of which are limited to circum134
/
Th e Universi
·
' ty h as ac h'ieve d ,
· these cases.
s t ances no t presen t in
by virtue of the trial court's ruling on partial summary judgment, a
giant leap backwards in the law to an outmoded application of a branch
of sovereign immunity, a sterile concept which has always been devoid
of logic in circumstances like those present here.
This Court should rule, in keeping with its own past decisions
and the current majority of American courts, that the government must
be estopped to recover under the circumstances present here.

As

Professor Davis has noted, the defense of estoppel against the govern·
ment "now has almost uniform support of decisions of the 1970s:

The

135/
doctrine of equitable estoppel does apply to the government."--

134.
The University's case are distinguished in the brokers'
joint memorandum opposing partial summary judgment at 56-64 (R.
2005, Bear Stearns file).
135.
K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §17.01
(1976). That the government is a state or local government as
opposed to the federal government makes no difference.
Id.
§17.06. Cases cited by Davis as evidencing the majority-Position
that s~ate and local governments can be estopped include, ~·
Fredericksen v. City of Lockwood, 6 Cal. 3d 353, 491 P.2d 805, 99
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1971); Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims Comrn'n.,
54 Haw. 621, 513 P.2d 1001 (1973); Pilgrim Turkey Packers, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 261 Or. 305, 493 P.2d 1372 (1972).
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II.

THE UNIVERSITY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER ON
EXECUTED CONTRACTS EVEN IF THEY ARE ULTRA VIRES.

The one case which the trial court continually invoked in the
course of proceedings below was a decision by this Court which refused
to enforce an executory ultra vires contract and which left the parties
where it found them. First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State
1361
University.
In that action, the plaintiff broker sought damages
for securities which the University had ordered but never paid for.
This Court simply applied in that case the long standing rule that
parties to an illegal contract will be left where they are found.

137

1

The court below incorrectly concluded that, since the broker was
not allowed to recover from the University in First Equity (on the
grounds that the contract on which it sought recovery was ultra
vires), it also follows that in these reversed situations, the University as a plaintiff is entitled to recover from the broker-dealers
on its contracts, also on the sole ground that those contracts were
ultra vires.

Such a result is not only illogical but in fact derives

no support from the First Equity decision, which simply refused to
enforce an illegal contract.

This Court should apply the same principle

again in these cases and reverse the trial court's partial summary
judgment order because of the fundamental principle that no one may
recover on an executed illegal contract.
This Court has previously applied the same doctrine and left the
parties where it found them.
136.

In Moe v. Millard County School District,

544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) ·

~· second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552,
562 (1925); Restatement of Contracts, §598 at 1109 (1932).

137.
138.
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a private contractor entered into a contract with the school district
to supply plumbing and heating fixtures for a school building.

The

contract was declared void because it exceeded the constitutional
debt limit.

While recognizing that the contractor could not recover

money still due on his ultra vires contract, this Court also held that
the contractor was not required to refund any of the payments already
made under that contract by the school district.

The Court ex-

plained: 1391
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding the
money that was paid [to the contractor by the school
district]. To that extent the contract has been
executed, and there certainly is no good reason why
in equity that matter should be reopened
As in Moe, a school here seeks recovery on executed, allegedly
ultra vires contracts.

All the purchases and sales of securities

which were the subject of those contracts have been fully consummated.
Each time that the University ordered stocks through any of these def·
endants, it received precisely what it paid for.

In Moe the contracto:

was allowed to retain payment for those plumbing and heating fixtures
which he had already installed in a school building and which the
school district therefore was allowed to retain.

In this case, the

University also kept all the items, i.e., securities, which it ordered
from the broker-dealers and therefore, as in Moe, the matter in equity
should be treated as closed.
In a later decision by this Court involving a contract between
the same school district and another corporation, the Court again left
the parties where it found them: 14 0/

139.

Id. at 151-52, 179 P. at 983 (emphasis added).

140.
Millard School Dist. v. State Bank of Millard County, 80
Utah
170,
185,
P.2d
967,
972provided
(1932)
(emphasis
added).
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When an ultra vires contract with a corporation has
been fully performed on both sides, neither party can
maintain an action to set aside the transaction or
to recover what has been parted with.
In other words,
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will
interfere in such a case to deprive either the corporation or the other party of money or property
acquired under the contract.
The University received precisely what it bargained for.

The

transactions are closed and equity requires that they remain closed.
Such a result would also conform with the ruling of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the University's earlier
federal suit, supra, that the University should not be allowed to
"take advantage of its own wrongful acts. 11141 /

B.

Ultra Vires Payments Made Under Mistake of Law Cannot Be

Recovered.
The University has alleged, as its sole basis for seeking recovery, that the payments in question were either ultra vires or were
made under a mistake of law.
not be recovered.

Payments made under a mistake of law may

It is beyond cavil that private parties may not

recover under such circumstances, and a number of courts have likewise
applied this principle to cases involving the sovereign.

The prin-

ciple is succinctly stated in the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, section 45:
Except as otherwise stated in Sections 46-55, a
person who, induced thereto solely by a mistake
of law, has conferred a benefit upon another to
satisfy in whole or in part an honest claim of
the other to the performance given, is not entitled
to restitution.

141.

549 F.2d at 168.
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Comment c elaborates:
The rule stated in this Section applies to a person who pays his own money or transfers his own
things.
It applies likewise to a payment by an
agent who, having power to bind his principal by
his negotiations with third persons, pays a debt
which the principal does not owe but which, because of his mistake of law, the agent believes
to be due.
Precedents abound which rule that a party making voluntary payments under mistake of law may not recover.

142

1

In a parallel case

involving a broker, one court noted, "In the case at bar the con tract
is fully executed and there is no valid claim that the defendant's
. any way d e f'icient.
.
,,143/
~perf orrnance was in
144 /
Enterprises v. Cartwright,

Quoting from Cornet Theatre

that court concluded, "There is no

equitable reason for invoking restitution where the plaintiff gets
the exchange which he expected." 145 / The University has not alleged
that the defendants' performance was in any way deficient.

It has not

alleged that it got anything from the exchange other than what it
expected.
tion.

There is therefore no possible reason to invoke restitu-

Indeed, equity cries for a contrary result.
The rule that voluntary payment made under mistake of law is not

recoverable must be applied to transactions with the State of Utah, at
least under the facts present here.

When government enters into

contracts it is governed by contract law -- whether it is the United
States, a state, a municipality, or a college.

As Justice Brandeis

elaborated, "When the United States enters into contract relations,

142.
~,Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U.S. 541 (1878);
City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. 720 (1866); Connecti~
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 95 Ind. 588 (1884).
143.
Richardson v. Roberts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 603, 26 Cal. Rptr.
829, 831 {Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
144.

195 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1952).
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its rights and duties are governed generally by the law applicable to
contracts between private individuals." 146 /

Like the United States,

the State of Utah is likewise subject to the commercial law applicable
to contracts between private individuals when it engages in commercial
activity.

It matters not whether the contracting party is "a State or

a municipality or a citizen. ,,l 47 /
For the independent reason that the courts abhor illegal contracts and that they will leave the

par~~es

to those contracts where

they find them, particularly where payment is made under mistake of
law, this Court should reverse the trial court's partial summary judgment in favor of the University and should remand the case with instructions to the court to enter judgment in favor of the brokerdealers on their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
III.

TO ALLOW THE UNIVERSITY TO RECOVER AGAINST THESE
BROKERS WOULD DENY· THEM DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW.
The trial court's denial to the brokers of all the affirmative
defenses which they asserted in answering the University's complaints
constituted a violation of the due process and equal protection
148/
clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions.~The court's
ruling denied the brokers equal protection of the laws because the
court engaged in a classification for purposes of this suit which is

146.

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1933).

147.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878).
See,~,
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Cobb v. City
of Malden, 105 F. Supp. 109, 112 (D. Mass. 1952). Accordingly,
the general rule that payments made under mistake of law cannot
be recovered is applicable in cases where the government is a
party. OlyrnpIC Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 627,
631 (W.D. Wash. 1958). Accord, Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98
U.S. 541 (1878); United States v. Edmondston, 181 U.S. 500 (1901).
148.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Utah
Const. Art.
I, and§2;
U.S.
Const.
XIV.
Library Services
Technology
Act, administered
by theAmend.
Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-45-

devoid of rational basis.

The court denied the broker-dealers due

process of law by its ruling that their property may be taken by the
University despite all the de£enses they asserted which are usually
available in actions like those at bar.
The trial court's refusal to recognize the defense of estoppel
in this proprietary conduct case constitutes an irrational and overbroad classification, since the government's right to resist estoppel
is properly no broader than its right to invoke sovereign immunity.
The classification of the University as an entity immune from the
defense of estoppel is irrational because it serves no legitimate
state purpose, as both the legislature and this Court1491 have express:
recognized that there is no justification for special treatment of the
sovereign where it acts in a proprietary capacity.
As explained earlier, the class of persons subject to the defense
of estoppel has traditionally included all private plaintiffs, whether
individual or corporate, and has also traditionally included sovereigr.
. cases invo
.
1 ving
.
.
. t.i ff s in
p 1 ain
or d'inary b usiness

.

15 0'

transactions.~-

To

exempt the University from the class of those persons subject to the
defense of estoppel must be based on some legitimate legislative or
public policy purpose, which clearly does not exist here.

The trial

court's classification of the University cannot stand by virtue of
149. Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§63-30-3 et ~· Utah
Code Ann. (Supp. 1978).
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799,
801 (Utah 1975) ("It is therefore our conclusion that propr1eta0
functions of a municipality are not within the coverage of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.").
To the same effect are Utah
Supreme Court decisions preceding enactment of the Governmental
!~unity Act.
Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement
~, 16 Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d 203, 205 (1965); Gordon v.
Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430, 431-32 (1964).
150. ~, cases cited by Professor Davis in support of his
conclusion that estoppel is freely available against the government at this time, supra n. 135.
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the equal protection principles expressed by this Court in Child v.
.
City of Spanish

151/

Fork:~-

[Individuals) may be treated differently by the law
. . . which divides them into classifications, if
the classifications have a reasonable relationship
to a proper and lawful purpose, and if all persons
within the same class are treated equally.
Similarly, the special protection accorded to the University by
the trial court offends due process of law, because the trial court
stripped the defendant brokers of the defenses which they would have
been entitled to had the state not been a party plaintiff.

The

Supreme Court of West Virginia, in a decision which is instructive
here, held that the state was not entitled to assert the defense of
sovereign immunity in response to a counterclaim filed against it by
152
the defendant. State v. Ruthbell Coal Co.
1. Dismissing plaintiff's
. of immunity,
.
.
. d :~153/
claim
the court exp 1 aine
Plaintiff first came into a circuit court far removed
from the place of defendant's corporate activities,
and hailed defendant . . . to the bar of that court.
Why then is plaintiff not bound by the same rules of
procedure as any party litigant? In invoking the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court . • • plaintiff,
in our opinion, has taken the position of an ordinary
suitor, and even if plaintiff is "a direct governmental agency of the State", • . . the State has laid
aside its sovereignty and the concomitant immunity
from an action or suit • • • and defendant, therefore, is entitled to assert by pleading and proof
all matters purely defensive.
The court held that to deny defendant the right to counterclaim would
violate due process:

154

/

We think it would be unconscionable and contrary
to the due process clauses contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
151.

538 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1975).

152.

133 W.Va. 319, 56 S.E.2d 549 (1949).

153.

56 S.E.2d at 555.

154.
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States, and Article III, Section 10 of the West
Virginia Constitution, to permit the State, as a
plaintiff, to bring a citizen into court for the
purpose 0£ asserting liability against such citizen, and then strip that citizen of all the procedural rights and defenses which he would have
if the State had not been a party plaintiff.
Likewise, in these cases, the trial court's refusal to recognize the estoppel and other defenses

as~erted

denial to them of due process of law.

by the brokers was a

For these independent consti-

tutional reasons, the court's partial summary judgment ruling should
be reversed, and the court below should be directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant brokers.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUM¥.ARY JUDGMENT FOR
THE UNIVERSITY, BECAUSE THE BROKER-DEALERS WERE ONLY
AGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY, NOT PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTIONS.
Defendants Hornblower and Sutro acted only as agents for the Uni·
versity in all of these transactions.

1551

Defendant Bear Stearns

acted primarily as an agent for the University, and acted as princi-

. a f ew
pa 1 on 1 y in

.

156/

transactions.~-

principal, but primarily as an agent.

Merrill Lynch acted partly as a
But the University made sub-

stantial profits on all securities purchased through Merrill Lynch,
for which reason Merrill Lynch filed a motion for summary judgment in
the court below.

157

All the defendant broker-dealers, when acting as

agents, were paid by the University for securities purchased and the

155.

Affidavits cited supra n. 5.

156.

Affidavit of David Cranston, Bear Stearns action, R. 1998.

15?. T~at motion was denied by the court below, not because the
University had not in fact made money through Merrill Lynch, but
only because of the court's uncertainty as to whether the Unive7sity's. theo7ies of recovery for prejudgment interest might
still
itLaw to
recovery.
Tr.
of Services
Dec. 4, 1978
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broker-dealers in turn passed on these payments to the sellers of the
securities.
services.158/

The broker-dealers only retained commissions for their
The University's ultra vires purchases and sales,

therefore, were entered into with the third party sellers, not with
these broker-dealers.
Assuming arguendo that the University is entitled to unwind the
hundreds of purchases it ordered over a three year period, the most it
is entitled to recover from these broker-dealers is the benefit they
received, which is limited to their commissions.

It is well estab-

lished that an agent is not liable on a contract executed by him on
behalf of another and for this reason the University may not recover
159
its principal losses from these broker-dealers.
/
In Unger v. Travel Arrangements,

l60.'

Inc.,~-

a customer sued a

travel agency to recover the amount he had paid the agency for a trip
later cancelled by a steamship company which became insolvent.

Since

the travel agency had passed the money on to the steamship company in
the reasonable belief that the .company was solvent, the court held
that the most the plaintiff could recover was any commission retained
J/ The court ruled:~-·
162 '
by the travel agency . .1:.§_
158.

Affidavits cited supra n. 5.

159. Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 161 Colo. 342, 421 P.2d
735 (1966); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins.
Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d 644 (1975); Seigworth v.
State, 91 Nev. 536, 539 P.2d 464 (1975); Restatement (Second) of
Agency §320 (1958).
160.

25 A.D.2d 40, 266 N.Y.S.2d 715, 721 (S.Ct. 1966).

161.

266 N.Y.S.2d at 721.

162.
Id. at 721-22, citing, ~, Restatement of Restitution
§143(b}; Restatement cf Agency, §339(f); Weiner v. Roof, 19 Cal.
2d 748, 752, 122 P.2d 896, 898 (1942).
This principle reflects
the majority view. ~· Bailey v. Reiman, 118 Cal. App. 2d 131,
257 P. 2d 94 (1953) (where an agent receives and delivers property
honestly and openly, the agent is not liable to anyone thereafter
for money received and transmitted); Karras v. Trione, 135 Colo.
229, 310 P. 2d 560 (1957) (rental agent not liable for return of
rent deposit);
United States Nat'l. Bank v. Stonebrink, 200 Ore.
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The fact that the agent credits the principal with
the amount received does not release the agent
from his obligation to make restitution so long
as he continues to hold the money on behalf of the
principal, . . • but when the agent parts with the
money in accordance with the agency, he is released
from liability.
Because the broker-dealers here no longer have possession of the
funds paid to them by the University, the University may not recover
from them.

The trial court erred in granting the University partial

summary judgment, and its order should be reversed.

v.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE BROKER-DEALERS
LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY BECAUSE THEY HAD REASONABLY
AND IN GOOD FAITH CHANGED THEIR POSITION IN RELIANCE
UPON THE REGULARITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS HERE AT ISSUE
For nearly three years and on hundreds of occasions, the brokerdealers received from the University payments for the purchases of the
securities at issue here.

In turn, the broker-dealers passed on to

the University the security certificates and passed on the purchase
price to the sellers.

The broker-dealers retained only their commis-

sions as their benefit of the bargain.

These commission payments were

paid out through the ordinary course of business to satisfy the regular
expenses of the broker-dealers.

In so doing, the broker-dealers rea-

sonably and in good faith changed their position in reliance on the
regularity of the transactions ordered by the University.

The Univer-

sity should not be allowed to recover monies delivered to the brokerdealers which haveong since been disbursed.
Any action for restitution, including the actions brought here
by the University, is based upon fundamental equitable principles.
As explained in comment C to Section 1 of the Restatement of Restitution:
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Even where a person has received the benefit from
another, he is liable to pay therefor only if the
circumstances of its receipt or retention are such
that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for
him to retain it.
or, as Justice Cardozo succinctly explained, "The plaintiff must show
that it is against good conscience for the defendant to keep the
163/
money."-The expenditure of funds wrongly received is a significant
change of circumstances that warrants denial of restitution.
164;
v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp .. - -

Sawyer

Because the broker-dealers changed their position over a three
year period and relied in good faith on the regularity of the numerous
transactions at issue, the University should in equity be precluded
from undoing those transactions.

The trial court's judgment in favor

of the University on liability should therefore be reversed.

163. Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N.Y. 352, 358, 106 N.E. 127, 128
(1914).
164.
236 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1956). There, the plaintiff oil
company brought an action for restitution of money paid to defendant lessors as compensatory royalties in lieu of drilling a well
on an oil and gas lease granted by the defendants. The compensatory royalty agreement was executed by the plaintiff lessee under
the false assumption that the lease agreement contained the usual
provision requiring a lessee to either drill a well or pay a
compensatory royalty.
Because of the mistake, the court ordered
restitution but held that equity required the deduction of any
expenditures or expenses incurred by the [defendants] because of
the receipt of the monies, inasmuch as they were guilty of no
fraud or deception."
Id. at 522.
Section 69 of the Restatement of Restitution elaborates:
"The right of a person to restitution from another because of a
benefit received because of mistake [of fact or law] is terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it would be inequitable to require
the other to make full restitution."
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VI.

THE UNIVERSITY HAD AUTHORITY TO INVEST NON-APPROPRIATED
FUNDS IN COMMON STOCK, AND BECAUSE CATRON WAS A FIDUCIARY
OF THE UNIVERSITY, THE BROKER-DEALERS ARE NOT LIABLE TO
IT EVEN IF IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO INVEST APPROPRIATED
FUNDS IN COMMON STOCK.
The University pooled both state appropriated and non-appropriatec
funds to purchase the securities at issue • .l..C..5/

The University had

clear authority to invest its non-appropriated funds in common stock,
. .
li§./
as evidenced by three Attorney Genera 1 opinions.

I t of

course

follows that, if the University could purchase stocks and other
securities, it could make commissions and interest payments incidental
thereto.
In addition to state appropriations, the University also receives
money from gifts, grants, tuition payments, dormitory rental, food
services and printing operations.ill./

Several statutes expressly

authorize the University to convert such funds into other property
and expressly authorize the University to invest and manage those

165. Response to First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff,
dated April 18, 1978, R. 1938 (Bear Stearns).
166. Exs'. B a~d ~ to the brokers' joint memorandum in opposition
to the University s motions for partial summary judgment. R. 2005
(Bear Stearns); Madsen Depo. at 19-20. Mr. Madsen was the Assistant Attorney General assigned as counsel to the University.
167. Sherrat Depo. at 26-28; Response to First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, April 18, 1978, R. 1938 (Bear Stearns).
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funds and their proceeds.l.6..6. /

It should therefore be clear that the

university may invest such funds in common stock.
This issue was squarely decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in
169/
.
.
.
.
Sendak v. Trustees o f In d iana University.~The Indiana Attorney
General there challenged the University's power to invest in common
stock with funds received from private gifts and bequests.

168.

The court

Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 provides, in pertinent part:
The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah State
University of Agriculture and Applied Science] in
its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant,
gift, devise or bequest any property real or personal for the use of any department of the college
and for any purpose appropriate to the objects of
the college.
It may convert property received. by
gift, grant, devise or bequest and not suitable
for its uses into other property so available or
into money.
Such property so received or converted
shall be held, invested and managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees for the
purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the
grant or donation.

It must be noted that the recently enacted State Money
Management Act, §§51-7-1 to -21 (Supp. 1977), for the first time
places legislative restrictions on the kinds of common stock that
properly can be purchased with funds from these sources. However,
no such legislative restrictions existed at the date of the transactions here at issue.
Utah Code Ann. §53-48-10 (4)

(1970) provides:

The dedicated credits, such as tuitions, fees,
federal grants, and proceeds from sales, received by the university and colleges may be retained by these institutions and used in accordance with each institutional work program.
In addition, section 53-48-20(3), authorizes the University to
invest all funds it receives to support research.
Each of the foregoing statutes therefore authorizes investments in common stock of non-appropriated funds.
169.

254 Ind. 390, 260 N.E.2d 601 (1970).
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held, under statutes considerably less expansive than the foregoing
170/
Utah statutes,~- that the State of Indiana was not the owner of
these non-appropriated funds, and that the University's Board of
Trustees acted in the capacity of private trustees over such funds
and were subject only to the limitations placed upon those gifts by
the donors.

171/

Therefore, the Trustees could properly invest non-

appropriated funds in common stock.
Since the University had authority to invest at least its nonappropriated funds in common stock, it follows as a matter of law
that the University is barred from recovery by virtue of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act. 172 1

Mr. Catron was clearly acting as a fiduciary

of the University when he purchased these stocks, as fiduciaries are
defined in section 22-1-1 to include agents and officers of public or
private corporations.173/
Section 22-1-5 provides that, whenever a fiduciary draws a check
in the name of his principal and that fiduciary is empowered to write
checks on behalf of his principal for any purpose, "the payee is not
bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his

170. Accordingly, this statement by the Indiana Supreme Court
becomes even more compelling when applied to the University, with
its considerably broader statutory power to invest in common
stocks with private endowment funds.
171.

260 N.E.2d at 603.

172.

§§22-1-1, et

173.

§22-1-1 defines fiduciaries to include:

~·

Utah Code Ann.

(1976).

a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied,
resulting or constructive, executer, administrator,
guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee
in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation,
public or private, public officer, and any other
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any
person, trust or estate.
[emphasis added).
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obligation as fiduciary . • • and is not chargeable with notice
that the fiduciary is conunitting a breach of his obligation as fiduciary," unless the payee has actual knowledge of that breach of duty.

174

It follows, by virtue of the operation of the Utah Uniform Fiduciary Act, that the broker-dealers were not put on constructive notice
that Catron might be violating a fiduciary duty to the University when
he had checks drawn on its behalf to pay for stocks, and since the
broker-dealers also had no actual notice of any such breach of duty,
they must be relieved of liability to the University.

Accordingly,

the trial court's finding that the broker-dealers are liable to the
University should be reversed.
VII.
THE UNIVERSITY HAD AUTHORITY TO INVEST ANY OF ITS FUNDS
IN COMMON STOCK AND THE TRANSACTIONS HERE AT
ISSUE ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES.
The University alleges that it did not have power to enter orders
for the purchase of securities with the broker-dealers.

As a matter

of law, the University did have such power because (1) the University
has a traditional legislative general grant of authority to handle its
finances, including investments, and (2) the legislature specifically
granted the University the power to invest in the securities purchased.
T h is Court, in First Equity Corp. v. Uta h State

.

.

175/ h

University,~-

as

held that at least some of the University's funds could not be invested

174.

Id., §22-1-5 (emphasis added).

175.

544 P.2d 887

(Utah 1975).
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/

in common stocks.

We believe that this decision was erroneous and now

urges this Court to reconsider and overrule First Equity.

The grounds

for overruling that decision are set forth in this argument, but we
hasten to add that, even if the court does not overrule its prior
decision in First Equity, the brokers are still entitled to judgment
in their favor by virtue of each of the foregoing independent arguments.
In 1888 the Territorial Assembly authorized the existence and
operation of an agricultural college, later to become the University,
and specified the powers of the trustees of that college, which included
"the general control and supervision of the agricultural college, .
of all appropriations made by the Territory for the support of the
same." 176;

In 1892 the Territorial Assembly broadened the

powers of the trustees by authorizing them "to exercise such other
powers as might be incidental or necessary to carry out the express
177/
powers."-

176.

Agricultural College Act, §4, 1888 Utah Laws 215.

177. This is noted in Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College,
119 Utah 104, 113, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (1950).
The University still has authority to exercise any "other
nec7ssary and proper • • • powers and authority not specifically
~em.ed to the Institution."
§53-48-15 (7), Utah Code Ann. This
necessary and proper" language of course echoes Article I, §8
of the Federal Constitution, which Chief Justice Marshall had
occasion to interpret in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(181~).
The discussion of that grant of power by the Chief
Justice bears repetition here:
Congress is authorized to pass all laws "necessary
and proper" to carry into execution the powers con~erred on i~.
These words "necessary and proper,"
in such an instrument, are probably to be consid7red as synonymous. Necessary powers must here
intend such powers as are suitable and fitted to
~he object; such as are the best and most useful
in relation to the end proposed.
If this be no so,
and if Congress could use no means but such as are
absolutely indispensible to the existence of a
granted po~er, the government would hardly exist;
at least, it would be wholly inadequate to the
purposes of its formation.
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When the Utah State Constitution was enacted in 1896, it preserved to the University "all the rights, immunities, franchises and
178/
endowments heretofore granted or conferred" to the University.--Essentially the same powers conferred on the Board of Trustees in 1892
were again conferred upon the University's Board of Trustees by the
179/
legislature in 1919,--- and were preserved in 1969, when the legislature eliminated the Board of Trustees and created a State Board of
180/
Higher Education, which succeeded to the trustees' former powers.--Each of these statutes from 1888 to 1969 expressly conferred authority
on the University's governing board to have general control of the
college and of all appropriations made by the State to the college.
In addition to the foregoing general grants of power to the University to manage and invest its appropriations, the legislature has
also given the University specific grants of authority to invest in
securities.

Section 53-32-4 gives the University full power to

receive and re-invest personal property.

Section 53-48-20(3) of the

Higher Education Act authorize~ the University to invest all funds and
proceeds received from research programs.
The only statutory limitation upon which the University has ever
based a claim that these funds are ultra vires, and upon which this
Court based its ruling in First Equity, is Section 33-1-1, which
simply supplements powers of public bodies and others to invest in
Similarly, if the University had authority only to exercise
specifically delegated powers, it too could hardly exist. This
grant of necessary and proper authority to the University in conjunction with its broad general grant of authority to invest real
and personal property must be construed to empower the University
to purchase and sell common stocks, since there was, at the time
of these investments, no express statutory restriction on that
power.
178.

Article X, Sec. 4, Utah Constitution.

179.

Utah State Agricultural College Act, §15, 1919 Utah Laws 45.

180.
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securities.

The act states on its face at section 33-1-3, that its

provisions are "supplemental to any and all other laws relating to and
declaring what shall be legal investment for the . . . organizations
• referred to in this Act."
Given both the general and specific statutory grants of authority
to the University to invest funds it receives, and the fact that the
University is not restricted to the securities identified in section
33-1-1 this Court should conclude that the University had power to
invest in the securities at issue here, and should therefore reverse
the trial court's finding that the broker-dealers are liable to the
University.
VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BROKERDEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM.
In addition to the foregoing erroneous rulings by the trial
court, it also erred when it denied all broker-dealers' Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

The broker-dealers

respectfully request that this Court reverse those rulings.
As noted in the preliminary factual discussion in this brief,

1811

the broker-dealers filed two Rule 12(b) (6) motions during the course
of proceedings below.

The first motion was denied before the broker·

dealers filed their counterclaims and cross-claims, 182 1 and their
second 12(b) (6) motion was denied at the time the court granted the
University's motion for partial swrunary judgment.183/ '

181.

See text supra nn. 86 and 99.

182.

Order cited supra n. 88.

183.

Order cited supra n. 101.
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When the broker-dealers filed their first motion to dismiss they
had not yet had occasion to undertake any formal discovery, but they
did present the court with the following uncontroverted facts, ascertained through informal discovery and information in their own
business records:
1.

The University opened its accounts with each broker-dealer

with the full knowledge and express prior written authority of its
principal officers and the Institutional Council (i.e., the written
resolutions, one of which is attached to the broker-dealers' memorandum as Exhibit B). 184/
2.

The University heirarchy never advised the broker-dealers

that it might lack power to purchase common stock.
These facts are essentially the same as those developed during
discovery, which merely supplemented these basic points and demonstrated the remarkable degree to which each of these transactions was
monitored by the Council.

When the broker-dealers' second motion to

dismiss was denied by the court, it of course had before i t all the
facts set forth in this brief, as each of them was argued in the
broker-dealers' joint memorandum opposing the University's partial
S nmm
~ .... ary

• d
JU
gment

•

185/

motion.~-

184.
This statement of facts presented to the court is greatly
summarized in this text. Many of the facts subsequently further
developed during the course of discovery were also initially
raised in support of the brokers' original motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
185. All those facts are set forth at length in the statement
of facts in the brokers' joint memorandum in oppostiion to the
University's motions for partial summary judgment, dated May 15,
1978, at 4-22.
R. 2005 (Bear Stearns).
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In support of both of their motions to dismiss the broker-dealers
raised a number of grounds for dismissal which they also raised as
affirmative defenses to the University's complaints, and which they
therefore also

r~ised

as grounds for opposing summary judgment in

favor of the University.

Because those arguments and defenses are

discussed in detail in preceding arguments they need not be reiterated here.
The arguments the broker-dealers raised to support their motions
to dismiss were:
l.

The University should be estopped to recover here (Argu-

ment I, supra).
2.

The University may not recover on executed illegal con-

tracts (Argument II, supra).
3.

Allowing the University to recover would deny the broker-

dealers due process and equal protection of law (Argument III, supra).
4.

The University had authority to invest non-appropriated

funds in common stock, and because Catron was a fiduciary of the
University, the broker-dealers may not be held liable to it (Argument VI, supra) .
5.

The University had power to invest all its funds in common

stock and these transactions were not ultra vires

(Argument VII,

supra) .
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Each of the foregoing grounds should have been independently
sufficient to result in judgment for the broker-dealers on their
motions to dismiss.

They therefore request that this Court reverse

the trial court's rulings on those motions and direct it to enter
judgment in their favor.

Even if the Court refuses to direct entry

of judgment in their favor on those 12(b) (6) motions they respectfully request that it reverse the order allowing partial summary
judgment to the University and allow them to raise and prove each of
those defenses in further proceedings.
CONCLUSION TO PART ONE
On each of the foregoing independent grounds, the broker-dealers
submit that the trial court erred in granting the University partial
summary judgment and in denying the broker-dealers' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Both of those rulings should be

reversed and judgment should accordingly be entered in favor of the
broker-dealers.
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PART TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
BROKER-DEALERS' THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS AND COUNTERCLAIMS.
INTRODUCTION
'!he foregoing arguments demonstrate that the University should
not be entitled to recover any sums from the broker-dealers.

If the

Court rules, as the broker-dealers have requested, that they cannot be
liable to the University under any of those theories, then it might
appear that there is no need to consider the question of reversing the
trial court's entry of final judgment in favor of the third-party
defendants and the University on the broker-dealers' third-party
complaints and counterclaims.
In fact, however, even if this Court does reverse the trial
court's summary judgment ruling, the broker-dealers should be entitled
to proceed on their third-party actions and counterclaim anyway, as
they seek indemnity and contribution against University officers and
Institutional Council members, not only for any damages eventually
awarded to the University in its complaint against the broker-dealers,:
but also for costs and attorneys' fees expended by the broker-dealers
in defending the University's actions.lJl...2./
The broker-dealers also request that this Court order the counter·
claims and third-party actions to be reinstated if it does not reverse
the trial court's partial summary judgment ruling.
The broker-dealers' claims for indemnity or contribution are
based upon theories of implied contract, warranty, implied warranty,
misrepresentation, and conduct outside the scope of authority.
186. McCormick on Damages, §66 at 246, §67 at 247-48, §68 at
250,
252.
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The

gravamen of all of those theories is that, when an agent is held
liable to a third person in circumstances where he is innocent and his
principal directed him to conunit the acts upon which recovery is based
by the third party, then the principal must reimburse his agent for

all amounts expended by the agent in defending the claims of the third
party.

The court below granted the third-party defendants' motions to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, 187 1 which of course presupposes
that under no conceivable state of facts could those persons who
actively implemented and supervised the University's investment program be held liable to the broker-dealers.
The broker-dealers wish to point out once again that they had no
opportunity to conduct any discovery against any of the third-party
defendants before the trial court dismissed the third-party actions
and counterclaims.

Therefore, in ruling on those parties' motions to

dismiss the broker-dealers' claims for contribution and indemnity, the
court was obliged to regard as true all allegations in the brokerdealers' pleading.i.aa../

The facts pled by the broker-dealers in those

actions were:
1.

The third-party defendants directed and authorized the Uni-

versity's investments in the subject securities.
2.

In connection with those investments, the third-party def-

endants represented in writing by formal corporate resolution to the
broker-dealers that the University had capacity to purchase stock,
that Catron had authority to order securities for the University, and

187.
The order granting those motions is discussed supra n. 95
and in accompanying text.
188. ~· Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965) (interpreting the identical federal rule 12).
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that the resolution would remain in full force and effect until revoke:
in writing.
3.

The broker-dealers believed that the University had capacity

to purchase securities and they did not receive notice that the

Uniw~

sity lacked such power or that Catron's authority had been revoked
until after all of the subject securities transactions had been completed.
4.

The broker-dealers acted as intermediaries or agents in

nearly all these transactions and were not sellers of the securities
at issue.
5.

The third-party defendan-ts were negligent or grossly negli·

gent in failing to determine that these securities purchases might be
ultra vires, while the broker-dealers were purely innocent agents.

Ir.

the alternative, if the broker-dealers are charged with constructive
knowledge that these purchases were ultra vires, then the third-party
defendants are also so charged.
6.

The third-party defendants exceeded their statutory autho-

rity in approving these investments.
If the foregoing facts are deemed to be true, the trial court's
dismissal of the third-party actions and counterclaims should be
reversed.

I.

THE BROKER-DEALERS' CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY AND
CONTRIBUTION STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THOSE CLAIMS.
The third-party actions instituted by the broker-dealers against
Institutional Council members and University officers were predicated,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not on the stock transactions themselves upon which the University
herein seeks recovery, but instead on the express warranties of capacity
and authority which were directed to each of them by the Council.
Accordingly, the broker-dealers' third-party actions do not suffer
from the legal defects in the University's complaints: the brokerdealers do not seek recovery on ultra vires contracts, but instead on
express misrepresentations and warranties.

Under well-settled prin-

ciples of law, those express warranties of capacity and authority give
rise to an implied contract to indemnify the broker-dealers from any
losses they may suffer as a result of their reasonable reliance on
those warranties.
If the broker-dealers are even constructively at fault in these
cases (i.e., if they are charged with constructive notice of the
illegality of these investments despite the foregoing arguments that
189
they cannot be so chargedJ,
/ then they are entitled to full indemnity
for all losses they ultimately sustain as a result of reliance on
representations by the Council.

On the other hand, if the court below

were to determine, following trial, that the broker-dealers were
equally culpable with the Council members and University officers,
then at least their claims for some contribution from those individuals state a cause of action under the general principles applicable
to joint wrongdoers. 190 1

189.

See nn. 120 through 125 supra and accompanying text.

190.
Joint wrongdoers are liable for contribution in any case
where they are both culpable. ~· 18 Arn. Jur. 2d Contributions
§§1, 8.
Contribution was allowed by this court in numerous cases
where the wrongful act of the defendant seeking contribution was
not intentional or negligent.
In Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129,
44 P. 833 (1896), the Court held that anyone who has conunitted a
tort which is one "arising from construction or inference of law,
and not arising from unknown or meditated wrong . . . may then
have contribution."
Id. at 141, 44 P. at 836.
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A.

The Broker-Dealers' Indemnity Claims Stated A Cause of

Act~.

Turning first to the broker-dealers' claims for indemnity, the
assurances of the Council to the broker-dealers constitute express
warranties of capacity and authority for which they are strictly
liable to the

broker~dealers

i f those warranties prove false.

This is

so because the whole purpose of warranty is to relieve the one so
.
191/
assured of his duty to inquire into the facts for himself.-Even should the broker-dealers be liable to the University and
charged with constructive notice of the limits of its capacity and
authority despite their diligent inquiries into those issues, and
192/
despite the Council's warranties to them,~- the law is replete with
statements that one only constructively liable may recover indemnity
from another party who is actually or primarily at fault.

For example,

one author states that "In the area of non-contractual indemnity the
right rests upon the fault of another which has been imputed or

And in Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903), the
Court found that the actions of the plaintiff seeking contribution had been innocent in purpose, and therefore the cause of
action had been properly stated. There plaintiff acted in good
faith on the representation of defendant that he could take
possession of certain chattels upon which defendant had a chattel
mortgage.
In taking possession he was not aware that his actions
constituted the tort of conversion. The court reiterated the
principle that, where the person held liable was acting in good
faith and without knowing that he was infringing on the legal
rights of third persons, he is entitled to contribution.
Id. at
449, 73 P. at 514.
191. ~, Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784
(2d Cir. 1946) (warranty is assurance of material fact upon which
prornisee is entitled to rely, is intended to relieve promisee of
duty of inquiry, and amounts to promise to indemnify promisee for
any loss if warranty is proved untrue.)
192. That the brokers should be relieved of the burden of constructive notice in these cases is explained at length, supra at
nn. 120-125.
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. 1 y f astene d upon h'im who seeks indemnity.
.
.
.193/
constructive
~To the
same

effe~t

is the statement that a person

is entitled to recover indemnity where, as between
the parties to the indemnity action, the defendant
is primarily liable while the plaintiff is only
secondarily liable -- that is, when the plaintiff
is only technically or constructively liable to the
injured party, or where his liability was based on
a legal or contractual relationship with the defendant. 194 I
Numerous holdings reaffirm the principle that a master held
liable because of respondeat superior (another legal fiction, analogous to constructive notice) may recover indemnity from the servant
who actually caused an injury, which is simply the other side of the
coin from the basis for indemnity asserted by the brokers here.
B.

ill,_·/

'

The Broker-Dealers' Indemnity Claims Based on Warranty

Stated A Cause of Action.
A warranty is any assurance by one party of the existence of a
material fact upon which a second party may rely.

Its express purpose

is to relieve the second party of his duty to inquire further into the
facts for himself.

A party who relies on an express warranty is

entitled to be indemnified for any loss he sustains because of the

193.

41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, §19 (emphasis added).

194.
Id., §20 at 707-08 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Accord:-- Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130, 146 (1932).
Leflar points out that the
right of indemnity may arise through contract, quasi-contract, or
tort, and notes that "the obligation to indemnify is not a consensual one; it is based altogether upon the laws notion
influenced by an equitable background -- of what is fair and proper
between the parties."
195. ~· Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109,
112, 493 P. 2d 625 (1972).
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warranty's falsity.12..§_/
In these cases of course the broker-dealers cannot be held

liab~

to the University at all if they are relieved of constructive notice,
as that is the sole basis for the University's theory of recovery.
Furthermore, these express warranties to the broker-dealers should not
only relieve them of any such constructive notice and should therefore
result in judgment in their favor on the University's complaint, those
warranties should for the same reason entitle them to recover on these
third-party actions.
C.

The Broker-Dealers' Claims For Contribution Stated A Cause

of Action.
The principles applicable to a claim for indemnity where one is
only constructively liable apply with equal force to a claim for con·
tribution.

A series of Utah cases has held that one only construct-

ively liable to an injured party may recover either contribution or
indemnity from the person primarily responsible.~/
D.

The Court Below Erred in Shifting All Liability On These

Transactions to the Broker-Dealers.
The court granted all the d1ird-party defendants' motions to
dismiss without setting forth any reasons for those dismissals in
196. ~· Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162 (Ct. Cl.
1968). See Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d
301 (Utah 1975).
197. Cases cited supra, n. 190. And see Holmstead v. Abbott GM
Diesel, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 109, 112, 493 P.2d 625 (1972) ("While a
master may be jointly sued with the servant for a tort of the
latter, . . . they are not joint tort-feasors in the sense that
they are equal wrongdoers without right of contribution, for the
master may recover from the servant the amount of loss caused him
by the tort . . • . ").
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. .
198/
its memoran d um d ecision.--

Th e on 1 y c 1 ues provided by the court

at later dates as to its reasons for dismissing the counterclaims
and third-party actions were two statements it made in the course of
other rulings.

At oral arguments on April 19, 1978, the court ex-

plained that its decision to grant the third-party motions filed by
the officers and Council members was based "primarily on

immunity."~

And the court also noted, in its final decision granting the University's motions for partial summary judgment, that:200/
This court feels that the brokers cannot escape liability for their illegal acts, acts with which they
are charged legally with knowing to be illegal by
saying officials of Utah State also knew this and
were charged with this knowledge. The Court feels
that where a governmental entity is involved and the
parties are charged with the legal use of public
funds that the other illegal party cannot escape
liability by saying the specific party he dealt
with does not come into this matter with clean
hands either.
In other words, if one "illegal party" is a government entity or
official, and the other "illegal party" is a private party, the trial
court believes that only the private party may be held responsible
for losses occasioned by the conduct of the government or its official.

Also clear in the court's statement is its belief that ordi-

nary defenses to an equitable action for restitution are not available
to defendants when they are sued by the government.

The broker-dealers

respectfully submit that this principle of law is untenable, grossly
unfair, and completely without legal foundation.

Accordingly, the

third-party actions should be re-instituted.
198.

R. 1775 (Bear Stearns).

199.

April 19, 1978 Tr. at 68

200.

October 27, 1978 memorandum decision, R. 2186.

(Vol. 237).
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD PARTY
ACTIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT THOSE DISMISSALS
WERE BASED ON GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
As just noted,201/ the court stated during the course of oral
arguments on April 19, 1978, that its "primary" ground for dismissing
the third-party complaints was that of immunity.

The court erred in

holding that the Council members and officers were immune in these
third-party proceedings, for a variety of reasons.
The Council members and officers did not claim immunity under the
Governmental Immunity Act, since that Act applies only to "governmental
entities" and does not apply to employees of "governmental entities."!!
Instead, they merely argued that they were entitled to a common law
"official immunity" for their conduct of official, discretionary
.
203/
duties.~The third-party defendants' recognition that they could
not invoke the protection of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was
204/
.
quite correct,~- but their assertion of common law immunity was not
well taken, and the trial court erred in ruling in their favor on that
basis.
A.

Officials !-lay Not Invoke Immunity If They Exceed Their

Authority.
A decision issued by this Court during the course of the proceed·

201.

See text at supra n. 199.

202 •. ~· Nov. 21, 1977 Tr. at 87-88
Campbell) .
203.

(Vol. 38)

(remarks of Mr.

Id.

204. ~, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1977)
("The Utah Government Immunity Act applies only to entities and
does not include individual [employees]
.") ·
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ings in these cases, and argued to the court below at oral arguments
on the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss, 205 1 clearly demonstrates the trial court's error in dismissing the claims against the
officers and Council members.

In Cornwall v. Larsen, 2 0 6 / a minor

was injured in a collision between the automobile in which he was
riding and a vehicle operated by a deputy sheriff.

He brought suit

against the county, the deputy sheriff and the sheriff.

The trial

court dismissed the suit as to all defendants, but this Court reversed
the dismissal as against the sheriff and other named individuals, and
207
remanded the case for tria1.
/
The Court ruled that the allegations
of the complaint stated a cause of action becuase they alleged that
the acts of the officer driving the emergency vehicle were willful,
208/
.
f
.
.
unlaw f u 1 , an d in excess o his authority.In an earlier decision,
this Court ruled that an officer engaged in the ,exercise of a governmental function was not protected from liability if he was acting in
.
209;
bad faith or outside the scope of his authority.~The allegations of the complaints filed by the broker-dealers
clearly meet the requirements for stating a cause of action against
individual government officers as set forth in Cornwall and earlier

205. Arguments of Mr. Christensen on behalf of Bosworth Sullivan,
Nov. 21, 1977 tr. at 62-64 (Vol. 38).
206.

571 P. 2d 925 (Utah 1977).

207.

Id.

208.

Id. at 927.

at 928.

209.
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367
(1968) .
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Utah cases.210/

The broker-dealers have alleged that the conduct of

the officers exceeded the scope of their authority, allege that those
officers were negligent in not ascertaining that the securities trans·
actions in question might be ultra vires, and allege that the officers
knew or should have known these facts.

The brokers also state a cause

of action against the officers and members for failing to notify them
earlier of their revocation of Catron's authority, a purely mini211/
sterial act which would also give rise to liability.~Whenever a public officer exceeds his authority or jurisdiction
in carrying out either ministerial or discretionary duties in this
state, he will be held personally liable to the private party injured
by his actions, if his actions are in excess of his statutory authority.212 /

It is clear that the third-party complaints stated claims

against the members and officers for acts outside their statutory
authority.

210. Any time an officer acts outside the scope of his authority,
he will be liable to anyone he injures.
Logan City v. Allen, 86
Utah 375, 381, 44 P.2d 1085 (1935) (officers performing discretionary acts "may become civilly liable where they act in excess
of authority"); Blomquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483
P.2d 430 (1971) (if county officials were mistaken with respect
to jurisdictional facts upon which they acted, then they would be
personally liable to plaintiffs); Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520,
527, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936) (no public officer may claim immunity
for the commission of an act entirely outside the scope of his
official duties.").
211.
It is undisputed by the third-party defendants that public
employees are liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts.
212.

Cases cited supra n. 210.
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This is best represented by a simple syllogism:

(1) if the

University is entitled to recover in its principal action against the
broker-dealers, it will do so on the sole basis that the securities
transactions at issue were ultra vires, i.e., not authorized by
statute;

(2) if the University lacks statutory capacity to engage in

the subject transactions, then the members and officers similarly
lacked statutory authority to order the securities at issue or to
issue the resolutions and ratifications of those transactions upon
which the broker-dealers relied in taking the University's orders;

(3)

accordingly, the acts of the officers and members are not protected by
conunon law official immunity, because they clearly exceeded their
statutory authority as alleged in the complaints.
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PART THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MERRILL LYNCH'S MOTION
FOR CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE OTHER BROKER-DEALERS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION
I.

MERRILL LYNCH'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
TO THE THIRD DISTRICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
There is no dispute that the venue of this action is governed
by Utah Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1953), which requires that an action be
tried in the county where either (1) the action arises or (2) the
defendant resides.

The University did not challenge the fact that

Merrill Lynch resides in Salt Lake County for venue purposes.

Since

defendant's residence is not at issue, the question here turns on
whether the cause of action arose in Salt Lake County or in Cache
County.
The lower court erroneously held that the cause of action arose
in Cache County.

In its memorandum decision, the court erroneously

found that the University's Cache Ccunty bank was "designated" by
Merrill Lynch to be its agent to accept securities on the University's
behalf and to pay Merrill Lynch.

The court erroneously reasoned that

the "wrong" was the payment for the securities by the University in
Logan and because payment was made by a Cache County bank acting as
"agent" for Merrill Lynch, the cause of action arose there.
The uncontroverted facts are that the University opened and
maintained an account with Merrill Lynch at its Salt Lake City

offi~ 1

that Merrill Lynch has not had an office or representative in Cache
County, Utah, that it received and forwarded all orders from the
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university for the purchase and sale of securities at its Salt Lake
office, that Catron placed approximately half of the University's
orders while he was in Merrill Lynch's office in Salt Lake City, that
the University, not Merrill Lynch, designated its bank in Logan, Utah
to accept securities ordered by the University and to pay Merrill
Lynch for the same, that Merrill Lynch never maintained an account
with the University's bank in Cache County, that Merrill Lynch had
no control over the University's bank, and that because the University's bank was continually late in making payment for securities
delivered, Merrill Lynch ceased doing business with the
A.

University~~2/

The Cause of Action Arose in Salt Lake County.
1.

The Cause of Action Arises Where the Defendant's

Wrongful Act Occurs.

Any Wrongful Acts Allegedly Committed By Merrill

Lynch Must Have Occurred in Salt Lake County.
214/
The cause of action occurs where the wrong occurs.-

If "the

two essential factors of the cause of action, namely, the right of
the plaintiff and the act or omission on the part of the defendant,
occur in different counties, the cause of action accrues in the
county in which defendant's wrongful act was done. 11 215/
What the University actually bases its venue claims on are its
own contacts with a bank in Cache County, not those of Merrill Lynch.
213. Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Change of Venue and accompanying Affidavits.
R. 21, 28, 30, 31,
85, 95, 97 (Merrill Lynch).
214. Bach v. Brown, 17 Utah 435, 439, 53 P. 991 (1898)
cause of action . . . is the wrong").

("the

215. 92 C.J.S. Venue, §80 at 776-77 and n. 96, citing several
authorities.
Accord:
State v. Lake Tavery, 252 P.2d 831 (Idaho
1953); Bergin v. Temple, 111 P.2d 286 (Mont. 1941).
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The plaintiff's own contacts with the forum are, however, irrelevant
for purposes of a motion for change of venue.

In an analogous case,

American Body & Trailer Co. v. Higgins71:2./ a plaintiff brought an
action against a corporation for breach of contract for sale of goods.
In determining where the cause of action "arose," the court found
that, where the plaintiff contracted to purchase goods in one county,
and the corporation assented to the contract in another county, venue
was proper only in the second county.
In the instant case, Merrill Lynch assented to the transactions
in question from its place of business in Salt Lake County, and all
other actions taken by it in this state on the University's behalf
occurred there.

Venue is proper only in Salt Lake County because

that is only where the wrong alleged against Merrill Lynch could
have taken place.
2.

The Logan Bank Was Not an Agent of Merrill Lynch.

The court below found that Merrill Lynch "designated"217/the
bank in Logan to receive the securities on the University's behalf,
although the University had not disputed Merrill Lynch's assertion
that the University, not Merrill Lynch, had chosen that bank.

The

court therefore concluded that the cause of action arose in Cache
County.

The University argued below that the acceptance of the Uni-

versi ty' s money is the "wrong" upon which the complaint is based, not
Merrill Lynch's acceptance and execution of the University's orders,
and the wrong occurred in Logan because the bank there was Merrill
Lynch's agent.
216.

156 P.2d 1005 (Okla. 1945).

217. R. 151 (Bosworth Sullivan file).
The Merrill Lynch file
does not contain a copy of that decision; it notes that this
memorandum
decision is contained only in the Bosworth file.
R.
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This position is based on the tenuous argument that the Utah
uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-201(1), not intended to
resolve venue questions, may be so construed as to make the Logan
bank the agent of Merrill Lynch.

The University argued that because

Merrill Lynch accompanied the securities sent to the Logan bank with a
sight draft to draw on the University's account for payment and because
the bank was a "collecting bank" and not a "payor bank" within the
meaning of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was Merrill
Lynch's agent.

Although these provisions of the Uniform Commercial

Code are inapplicable to questions of venue, it is clear that the
Logan bank was a "payor bank", not a "collecting bank" and thus not
the agent of Merrill Lynch.

This is made clear by the applicable

provisions of the Code.
Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-105(b) states that a "payor bank" is a
"bank by which an item [here, a sight draft) is payable as drawn or
accepted."

Official Comment (2) to the Uniform Commercial Code, as

adopted by the American Law Institute, states that:
The term
which an
an order
"payable

"payor bank" includes . . . a bank at
item is payable if the item constitutes
of the bank to pay, for it is then
by" the bank.

Section 70A-4-105(d) provides:
"Collecting bank" means any bank handling the
item for collection except the payor bank.
Clearly the Logan bank was the payor bank on the item.

Because

the Logan bank was the payor bank, it was not Merrill Lynch's agent
under §70A-4-201(1).

The action did not arise in Cache County.

It

arose in Salt Lake County, and the court below erred in denying Merrill
Lynch's motion for change of venue.
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3.

A Defendant's Right to be Sued in the County of His

Residence is Not Lightly to be Denied.
The privilege conferred on a defendant of being sued
in the county of his domicile is a valuable and substantial right, which is not to be denied except in
strict compliance with the law, as where the case
against defendant clearly comes within one of the
statutory exceptions to his right to be sued in the
county where he resides.218/
Statutes permitting suit in some place other than the defendant's
domicile are in derogation of this common law right and must be construed

strictly~l 9 /

But even if it is assumed arguendo that some

facet of the cause of action here arose in Cache County, venue is
still properly laid in Salt Lake County.
[I]t has been said that it would lead to confusion and the practice of "forum shopping" if the
law were to permit a suit to be commenced against
a corporation in any county where any facet of a
complex transaction occurred.220/
Merrill Lynch is entitled to defend this action in the county where
it resides.

The court below erred in denying its motion for change

of venue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE MOTIONS OF
BEAR STEARNS, HORNBLOWER AND SUTRO TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION.
The lower court erroneously held Bear Stearns, Hornblower and
Sutro were subject to in personarn jurisdiction in this state even
though the University opened accounts with them in California, sent
its agent there to meet personally with them on several occasions

218. 92 C.J.S. Venue, §82 at 780-81 (citations
added) .
~~219.
220.

emitted, emphasis

Id., §82 at 781 (and authorities cited therein).
77 Arn. Jur. 2d Venue, §38 at 884 (citations omitted).
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and even though no employee or agent of these broker-dealers ever
met with any representative of the University in this state.

2211

The

court so held because (1) these broker-dealers advertised in periodicals published outside of Utah but with national circulation and
(2) they mailed securities, confirmation slips, and monthly statements to the University in Logan.

222

/

Decisions of the Utah Supreme

court interpreting Utah's long-arm statute demonstrate that Utah does
not have personal jurisdiction over these defendants.
In 1969 the Utah legislature adopted §78-27-24, Utah Code Ann.,
Utah's long-arm statute.

Pursuant to this statute, a person submits

himself to the jurisdiction of this state
As to any claim arising from:
(1)

the transaction of any business within this
state;

(2)

contracting to supply services or goods in
this state;

(3)

the causing of any injury within this state,
whether tortious or by breach of warranty.

While the long-arm statute also sets forth other bases for jurisdiction, the University has alleged jurisdiction over these defendants
223;
pursuant to the foregoing provisions only.~A.

The Defendants Are Not Subject to In Personarn Jurisdiction

in the State of Utah Because They Have Not Engaged in Substantial
Activities Within the State.
221. Memoranda and accompanying Affidavits supporting motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
R. 45, 57, 59, 61
(Bear Stearns); R. 23, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44 (Sutro); R. 23, 36, 38
(Hornblower) .
222. Memorandum Decision filed Jan. 18, 1977 at 2.
Stearns) .

R. 293 (Bear

223. University memoranda opposing motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. R. 129, 265 (Bear Stearns).
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In Producers Livestock Loan Co. v.

224/

Miller,~-

this Court held

that the activities performed by a Utah resident on behalf of the
nonresident defendants constituted substantial activities within the
state.

Therefore, the defendants were subject to the jurisdiction of

Utah courts under the long-arm statute.

In his opinion holding that

jurisdiction existed, Justice Crockett acknowledged that there are
necessary and desirable limitations to the extension of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants: 22 5/
[I]n order to assert jurisdiction over a party, it
must appear that he engaged in some substantial
activities within the state beyond . . . merely
transitory matters • . • , so that it is reasonable
and just to assume that he has had the benefit of
the protections and advantages of the laws and
institutions of the state to the extent that it
is within the concept of fairness and due process
that he be subjected to the jurisdiction of its
court.
In Producers Livestock, the nonresident defendants operated a livestock operation outside Utah and hired a Utah resident to act as
manager.

At all times the livestock was expressly designated as

belonging to the nonresident defendants.

The resident carried on the

business in Utah for the defendants , had an office here, and obtained
a loan here to finance the livestock operation.

The Court found that

the resident was an agent of the nonresident defendants.

Therefore,

insofar as the Utah resident was doing acts within the scope of his
authority in Utah, the defendants were deemed to be performing those
226
acts themselves.
/
In contrast, the defendants in this case had no person or agent
transacting any business in Utah for them.
224.

580 P.2d 603 (Utah 1978).

225.

Id. at 605.

226.

Id. at 606.

Moreover, the activities
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conducted by the defendants in Utah are much less substantial than
those engaged in by the New York defendants through their representative in Producers Livestock.

The broker-dealers' activities (mailing

documents) in Utah were merely incidental to the securities transactions which took place in California.

The University voluntarily

decided to conduct its stock purchasing business in California rather
than in Utah.

It opened and maintained accounts with defendants at

their respective offices in California.

The University's investment

officer placed orders for securities purchases which were accepted by
defendants in California and executed on the University's behalf on
national exchanges outside of Utah.

Payment for these securities

occurred outside of Utah.
The

activi~ies

of these broker-dealers found to be significant

by the court below are comparable to some of the transitory matters

acknowledged by Justice Crockett in Producers Livestock to be outside the jurisdictional powers of· Utah courts: 22 71
(1)

Where a person buys stock in a corporation,
such as U.S. Steel or General Motors, where
the enterprise is located in and carried on
in another state; or

(2)

Where a manufacturer advertises and distributes his product for sale through independent
dealers or retailers in other states.

In such instances, it is very likely there will be incidental activities involving the exchange of money from a bank in one forum to
another, or various mailings between the parties such as the confirmation slips and account statements in this case.
cant activities incidental to such matters would

227,

These insignifino~

serve to bring

Id. at 605.
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the transaction within the jurisdictional power of this state.

The

University's actions against these defendants should be dismissed for
lack of in personarn jurisdiction.
B.

The Defendants Have Not Transacted Business in Utah.

This Court set forth in Hill v. Zale Corp.,

228

1 - a decision

cited favorably in Producers Livestock -- a number of factors to be
considered collectively to determine if a corporate defendant was
"doing business" and thus established the minimum contacts necessary
to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction:
(1)

Whether there are local offices, stores or
outlets;

(2)

The presence of personnel, how hired, fired
and paid;

(3)

The manner of holding out to the public by way
of advertising, telephone listing, catalogues,
etc.;

(4)

The presence of its property, real and personal, or interest therein, including inventories, bank accounts, etc.;

(5)

Whether the activities are sporadic or transitory as compared to continuous and systematic;

(6)

The extent to which the alleged facts of the
asserted claim arose from activities within
the State;

(7)

The relative hardship or convenience to the
parties in being required to litigate the controversy in the State or elsewhere.

Under these considerations, and after analysis of the facts in the
cases decided by this Court, it is clear that these defendants were
not doing business in the State of Utah.

. ·p1 astics
.
In Uni. 0 n Sk.i c o. v. union

229 I -- a case wh'icn
.

Corp.~-

more closely reserrililes the factual setting of this case -- the Cour:
228.

25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971).

229.

548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976).
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held that Utah courts did not have in personarn jurisdiction over a
California company that had contacts in Utah much more substantial
than those of the defendants here.

The defendant company in that case

had no office or store in the state, no property, inventory, telephone
listing or bank account, and did no advertising in Utah.

In addition,

the contract at issue was executed in California, payments were made
to the defendant's bank in California, and the ski boots were to be
manufactured there.

The contacts which the defendant did have with

Utah did not amount to conduct or activity beyond a mere casual or
.
transitory

230/

presence.~-

In Foreign Study League v. Holland-American Line,

231

/

the Court

upheld the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, but only after observing
that defendant's representatives had on several occasions traveled to
the State of Utah to conduct business with the President of the plaintiff corporation.

Also, the defendant corporation had authorized

nUI:lerous agents within the state' to display defendant's literature, to
"sell bookings" for defendant's ships, and to accept commissions for
accepted bookings.

Finally, defendant entered into agreements exer-

cising substantial control over the activities of its agents here.
Again, in contrast, the defendants in this case have not traveled to
Utah to conduct business and have never maintained any agents or
employees in the State.
C.

The Defendants' Activities in This State Do Not Constitute

The Minimum Contacts Sufficient to Permit Assertion of Jurisdiction by
Utah Over These Defendants.

230.

Id. at 1259.

231.

27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244

(1972).
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J

As stated by the United States Supreme Court:

232

1

Due process requires only that in order to subject
the defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present wit~in the territory o~ the forum, he
has certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
It is apparent that the activities of defendants do not rise to
a level which would satisfy the due process clause.

All of the busi-

ness transactions that took place between these parties took place in
California or by telephonic communications.

Defendants have never

maintained offices, telephones, telephone listings, office equipment,
employees, agents, books, bank accounts, records or the like, or
advertised in Utah.
The defendants' advertising in national publications does not
constitute contacts which rise to the level of fair play.

The Utah

legislature has recognized that it would be unfair and unreasonable
to require foreign broker-dealers to register in Utah simply because
they advertise in national publications which are read in Utah.
Utah Blue Sky Law, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-26(4).

See

Similarly, the con-

firmation slips and account statements mailed by the defendants to the
University are merely contacts incidental to a transaction that occurred in California.

These documents served only to provide a record

after the fact of the activity authorized by the University in its
accounts in California -- they were not the activity.

The stock

certificates sent to Utah were of a nature similar to that of the
confirmation slips and account statements; thus that contact does not
rise to a level which satisfies the due process clause.

232.

International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

-84-

(1945).
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Finally, it would offend traditional notions of fair play to
assert jurisdiction over the defendants on the basis of the telephone
calls received by them from the University.

This Court has expressly

held that nwnerous telephone calls into the State, occurring over a
fifteen year period, will not sustain personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant.

In Cate Rental Co., Inc. v. Whalen &

Co.;~

jurisdiction was lacking even though "defendant called plaintiff by
telephone .

.

. on the average of five times a year for the past ten

years," in order to arrange for leasing plaintiff's equipment.

More-

over, it must be remembered that those telephone calls were made to
effectuate business in California, and not in Utah as has already been
explained.
In summary, these three defendants were not properly subjected
to personal jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute, and the
University's complaints against them should be dismissed.

233.

549 P. 2d 707

(Utah 1976) ·
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CONCLUSION
No party to any of these actions has alleged or could allege that
these defendant broker-dealers did anything during the period from
September 1970 through March 1973 other than to scrupulously, fairly,
and diligently carry out instructions given to them by the governing
body of the University.

That same group of officials initiated and

defined the governing policies of the University's investment program,
approved every purchase and sale at issue here, had actual knowledge
of the transactions executed for the University, and affixed the
University's corporate seal to their representations of capacity and
authority to each broker-dealer.

Now the University seeks to recover

all the funds which those individuals allegedly misspent, from defendants who were not even parties to the underlying transactions.
Allowing recovery to the University under those circumstances and
denying the broker-dealers their right to indemnity and contribution
would be not merely incomprehensible but would also defy due process
of the law and would serve no legitimate public policy.

The broker-

dealers cannot state the equities underlying their position with
respect to both the University's complaint and the third party actions
more succinctly than this Court has itself explained

~emt.l!./

In determining legal rights on the basis of fairness and justice, the idea of sovereign immunity
is perplexing.
It has the effect of clothing one
party to the controversy with an advantage which
is in most instances unfair and unwarranted.

234. Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417,
425-26, 142 P.2d 657, 660 61 (1943).
The court in that case
estopped the Board from reducing pension payments to a retired
school teacher under a new statute which would no longer authorize
those paym7nts.
Instead, the court ruled, the State must continue
t~ pay a higher amount than that allowed by statute to the plaint7ff, even though such payments would be ultra vires and prospective (ra~her than purely retrospective, as is the case with the
amounts involved herein).
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The State is merely a collection of individuals, and
there seems to be no logical reason why the collective entity should not be bound by the same concepts
of justice and morality as its individual members, at
least with respect to contractual obligations.
Accordingly, the broker-dealers respectfully request the
following relief from this Court:
1.

Reversal of the partial summary judgment orders entered

in favor of the University, with directions to the trial court to
reverse its rulings denying the broker-dealers' second motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and to enter judgment in favor
of all broker-dealers on those motions to dismiss.
2.

Reversal of the final judgments entered in favor of the

third-party defendants and the University on the third-party complaints
and counterclaims.

This relief should be granted regardless of how

the Court rules on the partial summary judgment question.
3.

If the Court does not grant the broker-dealers the

relief requested in paragraph 1 above, then they respectfully request
that it reverse the trial court's rulings on personal jurisdiction and
venue.

If it does so, then the complaints against Sutro, Bear Stearns

and Hornblower should be dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction
and the Merrill Lynch action should be transferred to the Third
District Court.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1979.

§J.jk

~~
w.
~lene
Lowe
Attorneys for Defendants
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APPENDIX A
BUSINESS SOPHISTICATION OF UNIVERSITY OFFICERS
AND INSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS
A brief description of the business experience and sophisticatioo
of Institutional Council members and University officers demonstrates
that considerable business acumen was brought to the investment progrM
1)

Councilman Plowman was, during the period in question,

President and Chairman of the Board of Lewiston State Bank in Cache
County.
the bank.

He handled the municipal and governmental bond portfolio for
For liquidity reasons, he invested in high grade municipals

and government issues.~/

As an Institutional Council member, he was

a charter member of the University's investment committee and as such
he attended the Ford Foundation seminar in San Francisco in January
1971.y

2)

Councilman Bullen received his MBA from Harvard Univer·

sity, is a successful businessman, and has purchased securities,

3/

including common stocks for his own account, for the past 25 years.-

He also attended the Ford Foundation seminar in January 1971 and was a
charter member of the investment committee.±/
3)

Councilman Hammond was Senior Vice President for First

Security Bank from 1950 to 1970 and in that capacity was in charge of

1.

Plowman depo. at 7-9.

2.

Exs. 10, 197.

3.

Bullen depo. at 7-8.

4.

Exs. 10, 17.
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its Northern Division, which includes all its banks from Davis County
to Idaho.

He was familiar with the bank's trust department and the

securities purchased by that department, as well as the standards and
policies set by the bank regarding such purchases.
was diversification, to spread the risk of loss.

One such policy
Whether to purchase

a conservative or speculative security was given great consideration
by the bank.

He has also purchased securities for his own account.

When he graduated from college in 1924, he was employed as a salesman
with a brokerage firm, selling stocks and bonds.

He understands the

traditional considerations used to determine the quality of a
4)

security.~

Councilman Harris was on the Board of Directors of

First Security Bank, is a "good" and "successful" businessman and, in
connection with his business, has large borrowings from the three
largest banks in Western America.0'

He also served as chairman of

the investment committee as early as April 1972.2/
5)
ant.

Councilman Stockdale is a certified public account-

From the early 1960's to the present, he has supervised the

investment of endowment funds of Brigham Young University in common
stocks and bonds.

In addition, from 1969 to 1971 he gave advice to

clerks in his office in regard to handling common stocks on a regular
basis.

He has also performed this service for a number of his accounts.

He served on the Business Affairs and the Investment Committees of the
University . .§./

5.

Hammond depo. at 7-13.

6.

Harris depo. at 31.

7.

Ex.

8.

Stockdale
depo. at 7-17.
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6)

Councilman Olsen is a successful rancher who has been

purchasing stocks in his own account for some 20 years and who under-

9/
.
stands the nature o f a margin account.7)

Councilman Bingham is a civil engineer who invested in

securities in his own account sufficiently to understand what a margin
account was.lO/

9.

Olsen depo. at 10.

10.

Bingham

depo~

at 9.

-90-
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API-ENDIX "B"
CORPORATE RESOLUTION:

l, _ _ _ _ _ _L_._M_ar_k_N_e_u_hc_r..,.g.._f'_r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , being duly constituted
St•rreta ry to the _ _ _ln_s_h_·tu_ti_o_n_:i_l_C_,,_111_n...;.c_il'-1''--"U-'-t:i"-h.;...;.S;..;.t."l;.;.l;_t'--'-l1.;.:n..:..iv'-'t'-''r;..;.s;..;.i.:.ty'--------a corporation organized and existing under and by the virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah (hereinafter called this Corporation) do hereby certify that the following is
a true and complete copy of resolutions duly adopted at a meeting of the Board of
Directors of this Corporation, duly called and held on _ _J_a_nu_a_rv
__2_0~,_1_9_7_2_ _ __
at which a quorum was present and voting; that said resolutions are still in full force
and effect and have not been rescinded; and that said resolutions are not in conflict
with the Charter or By-Laws of this Corporation.
BE IT RESOLVED: That this corporation is authorized and empowered to open
and maintain an account with any broker who is a member of any of the major security
exchanges or the National Association of Security Dealers for the purchase, trade,
and sale, long or short, transfer, and assign, stocks, bonds, and securities of every
nature on margin or otherwise, and that any of the officers hereinafter named be, and
hereby is authorized to give written or verbli.l instruction to the brokers concerning
the herein named transactions; and he shall at all times have authority in every way to
bind and obligate this corporation for the carrying out of any contract or transaction
which shall, for or on behalf of this corporation, be entered into or made with or
through the brokers; and that the brokers are authorized to receive from this corporation, checks and drafts drawn upon the funds of this corporation by any officer or employee of this corporation, and to apply the same to the credit of this corporation or to
its account with said brokers: All confirmations, notices, and demands upon this corporation may be delivered by the brokers verbally or in writing, or by telegraph, or by
telephone to any such officer and he is authorized to empower any person, or persons,
that he deems proper, at any time, or times, to do any and all things that he is hereinbefore authorized to do. That this resolution shall be and remain in full force and effect
until written notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the brokers. The
officer(s) herein referred to and named as follows, to-wit:
(1)

Dee A. Broadbent, Vice President of Business and Treasurer

(2)

Donald A. Catron Controller
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Page IT

Corporate Resolution:

I, _ _ _ _ _ _. . :L::..:. . -'M-"'""ar"'"k--"N""e'"'u""bc"'""'r..,.g._e_r__________ , Secretary of
Utah State University Institutional Council
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of a resolution duly
and regularly passed and adopted by the unanimous vote of the Board of Directors of
said company at a meeting thereof duly called and held at the office of said company
on the ___2_o_th___ day of _____J_a_n_u_a....:ry'---------• 19-23_, at which meeting the directors were present and voting, that said resolution appears in the minutes
of said meeting, and that the same has not been rescinded or modified and is now in
full force and effect.
I further certify that said corporation is duly organized and existing, and has
the power to take the action called for by the foregoing resolution.

SEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed this

of the following:

Ll 'f{

day of

r

I

1979 to each

Darwin C. Hansen, 110 West Center Street, Bountiful,
Utah 84010, attorney for third-party defendant Donald
Catron;
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Michael Heyrund, of Watkiss
& Campbell, 310 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, attorneys for Phillip A. Bullen, Jay R.
Bingham, O. C. Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly D. Kurnpfer,
Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, W. B. Robins, Alva C. Snow,
William R. Stockdale, Jane S. Tibbals, Glen L. Taggart,
Dee A. Broadbent, L. Mark Neuberger, defendants and thirdparty plaintiffs;
David L. Wilkinson, Co. Attorney's Office, Room C-220,
Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, Utah,
attorney for Utah State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science;
Lyle W. Hillyard, 175 East 100 North, Logan, Utah

84321;

David R. Melton, Esq., of Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd.,
5720 Sears Tower, 233 So. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois
60606.

~1k<
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